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ABSTRACT 
Designing and Orchestrating Embedded Innovation Networks: An Inquiry into 
Microfranchising in Bangladesh 
By 
Laté M. Lawson-Lartego 
May 2016 
Committee Chair: Lars Mathiassen 
Major Academic Unit:  J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
Microfranchising has emerged as a potential strategy to rapidly scale up 
entrepreneurship within base of the pyramid (BOP) markets in order to contribute to 
poverty reduction and to increase economic growth. However, we know little about how 
such networks are designed and orchestrated in resource-scarce settings to co-create value 
with the different parties involved. To address this gap, we report a longitudinal case study 
of an emerging microfranchise network social enterprise, currently facilitated by CARE, a 
global humanitarian and development organization, to provide timely access to quality, 
affordable agricultural input and services for millions of small-scale poor farmers in 
Bangladesh.  We draw on the orchestration of innovation network theory developed by 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and the notion of network imprinting (Marquis and Tilcsik, 
2013) to analyze the emerging microfranchise network in Bangladesh. As a result, we offer 
two types of contributions to theory and to practice. First, we offer a detailed account of 
how these theories are relevant and applicable to analyze and explain the emergence of 
microfranchise networks, and we present two key propositions to generalize to theory. 
Furthermore, we propose an integrated framework, combining the two theories for scholars 
and practitioners interested in designing innovation networks. Second, based on these 
empirical results and extant theory, we offer three main lessons for practitioners to advance 
 xiii 
the industry by designing and orchestrating microfranchise innovation networks in 
embedded contexts to achieve positive financial and social impacts.     
 
Key words: Social enterprise, microfranchising, orchestration of innovation network, 
network imprinting, bottom of the pyramid, farmers, agriculture input and services. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
With about half of the world population at the Base of the Pyramid (BOP)—which 
is estimated to be over 2.6 billion people living with less than $2 a day (World Bank, 2014) 
and the decreasing aid investment, poverty reduction could no longer be treated only as a 
charity case. The seminal work done by Prahalad and Hammond in 2002 has attracted 
enormous attention from Multi-National Companies to the BOP as an opportunity to grow 
new markets and contribute to poverty reduction. Charitable organizations are also 
evolving their strategy to sustainably reduce poverty and multiply impact with market-
based solutions (Fowler, 2000). New business models have emerged in the BOP market, 
one such model is microfranchising. The term microfranchising differs from the traditional 
notion of franchising by its emphasis on generating public benefits that has the potential to 
reduce poverty and create social benefits for BOP rather than generating private wealth 
(Christensen, Parsons, & Fairbourne, 2010). Nevertheless, to survive and generate the 
necessary financial resources for scaling, microfranchises retain a focus on economic 
growth and efficiency as a means of achieving their poverty alleviation goals (Kistruck, 
Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011).  
Although there is an increasing interest in microfranchising and early stage research 
has brought attention to many of the potential benefits of microfranchising (Fairbourne, 
2007; Gibson, 2007; Magleby, 2007), there is a gap in the literature analyzing how this 
model could be orchestrated as an innovation network to co-create value with BOP 
entrepreneurs and contribute to poverty reduction. Furthermore, emerging microfranchise 
networks assemble existing entrepreneurs with their past and current ties, practices and 
position into a brand new business model. Effective leveraging of the microfranchising 
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model therefore requires an awareness of the imprinting that those entrepreneurs and firms 
come with to join the new business and strategies and tactics to manage and leverage the 
imprinting in order to achieve the new outcomes. Against this backdrop, we set out to 
understand how the orchestration of innovation network theory combined with the network 
imprinting concept can be used to study an emerging microfranchise network in the food 
and agriculture sector. Our study takes a step forward exploring how these theories could 
be extended, combined and adapted for scholars and practitioners interested in designing 
and orchestrating microfranchise innovation networks in resources scarce areas for poverty 
reduction and value co-creation.  Overall then, the dissertation makes use of the style 
composition (Mathiassen et al., 2012) summarized in Table 1 below. The different 
elements of this research design will be motivated, described and further elaborated in the 
subsequent sections of this dissertation. 
Table 1: Summary style composition of the proposed research 
RQ: Research 
Question 
How does an organization, in this case CARE, design and orchestrate an 
embedded microfranchise innovation network to facilitate the timely provision of 
affordable and quality agriculture inputs and services to BOP farmers in 
Bangladesh?   
P: Problem in the 
real world 
With over 800 million people in the world going hungry every day, and with a 
broken agriculture value chain unable to deliver quality and affordable input and 
services to BOP farmers, how to develop and sustain a network of 
microfranchisees and other institutions to offer uninterrupted, timely access to 
quality, affordable agricultural input and services to BOP farmers in Bangladesh? 
AC: Area of concern BOP and microfranchise literature  
F: Theoretical 
Framework 
Orchestration of innovation networks 
Network imprinting  
M: Methodology Longitudinal qualitative case study  
C: Contribution Cp: Three lessons offered to improve the design and orchestration of 
microfranchise innovation networks to achieve expected outcomes and long term 
sustainability.  
Ca: A detailed account of the design and orchestration of a microfranchise network 
through the lens of orchestration of an innovation network theory and network 
imprinting theory with three propositions to generalize to theory 
Cfa: An integrated framework for designing and orchestrating microfranchise 
networks for BOP engagement based on extant theory and drawing from empirical 
evidence 
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II PROBLEM SETTING  
We chose the food and agriculture sector because of the pressing need to increase 
agriculture productivity in many developing countries around the globe, with a market-
based approach to provide over 800 million hungry people access to nutritious food (FAO, 
2012), and to enable them to rise out of poverty. Bangladesh, in particular, is a country 
with a very high level of poverty, despite recent economic growth. Over 38% of the 160 
million people are food insecure and live in extreme poverty. Agriculture continues to play 
a strong role in the economy, despite a downward trend, representing 15.89% of the 
country’s GDP in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). Roughly 80% of Bangladesh’s population 
lives in remote rural areas, and 80% of these rural households make their living either as 
small-scale farmers or as landless cattle owners.  Both groups play a prominent role in the 
nation’s dairy sector, producing more than 90% of the country’s milk.  However, the formal 
dairy sector in Bangladesh has failed to integrate or benefit BOP farmers and landless dairy 
producers, giving them little incentive to increase production. Those producers also have 
poor access to the agricultural input and services they need (feed, fodder, medicine, 
vaccination, artificial insemination and other related input) because the input and service 
providers often do not serve the rural dwellers, or those who serve them are not in any sort 
of organized network and have a fragmented supply chain. As a result, outputs from the 
cattle from small-scale dairy farmers fall short of meeting the country’s needs. In 
Bangladesh, 10 million dairy cattle, including 4 million cross-breeds, produce 2.82 million 
tons of milk. This is much lower than in the neighboring Pakistan, where only 5.5 million 
dairy cattle produce 25 million tons of milk (Hemme, 2010). This represents one liter of 
milk per cattle in Bangladesh compared to 25 liters per cattle in Pakistan. Milk demand, 
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measured by per capita consumption, is increasing by 4% per year, which is higher than 
the growth in milk production (3.6%). This has led to a continuous widening of the gap 
between milk supply and demand (Uddin et al. 2011). This same situation applies to other 
agriculture sectors, such as crop, fishery and agroforestry, in Bangladesh and around the 
developing world where BOP farmers are poverty-trapped due to a lack of timely access 
to affordable, quality agricultural inputs and services.   
In an effort to address these constraints, CARE initiated a pilot initiative in 
Bangladesh in 2012 with the aim of creating a sustainable social enterprise called Krishi 
Utsho. The objective for Krishi Utsho is to provide timely access to the affordable, quality 
agricultural input and services needed by BOP farmers to increase their dairy outputs and 
to integrate them into the dairy value chain, but doing so in a financially sustainable 
manner. In order to achieve these dual objectives, Krishi Utsho is employing a franchising 
model known in the literature as Microfranchise (Fairbourne, 2007).  
Using this microfranchising model, Krishi Utsho is seeking to integrate existing, although 
malfunctioning, individual micro-entrepreneurs’ agro-input shop owners into a well-
functioning, credible, cohesive and well-branded network. In this process, Krishi Utsho is 
creating multiple partnerships with private sector input supplier firms (such as feed 
manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies) and other types of firms in order to improve 
the function of the input supply chain. Krishi Utsho monitors the performance of the shop 
owners within the microfranchise network, assisting them with solutions to management 
problems, and providing them with tailored business management training and various 
cattle health services. Figure 1 depicts the emerging Krishi Utsho microfranchise network. 
So far, Krishi Utsho has integrated 110 microfranchisees of various sizes into the network 
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with total sales of approximately $1 million per year. Under this initiative, farmers have 
seen milk production increase at least 50%, as well as an increase in family milk 
consumption and income. Krishi Utsho branded franchisee shops have also grown at a 
rapid rate and shop owners’ sales and net incomes have increased by at least 50% over the 
past three years.  The challenge for Krishi Utsho is to sustainably design and orchestrate 
this network and to continue to innovate in order to allow millions of BOP farmers’ 
uninterrupted quality, and the affordable access to the agricultural inputs and services they 
need. In doing so, Krishi Utsho needs to address the imprinting challenge of the path 
dependencies of the network. 
  
 
6 
 
Figure 1: Krishi Utsho’s Business model 
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III THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
As much as businesses have to continuously innovate to remain competitive in their 
market (Van de Ven 1986), global and national nonprofit organizations aiming to combat 
poverty and competing for limited donor resources are also re-inventing themselves to stay 
innovative and relevant.  To innovate, nonprofit organizations have to forge new types of 
partnerships with commercial as well as non-commercial actors. Increasingly, many 
nonprofit organizations have also embraced the concept of social enterprise which consists 
of utilizing market based approaches and solutions to solve complex poverty issues, reduce 
social harms and advance public benefits (Rangan et al., 2008).  
One such type of social enterprise is the microfranchise network. Microfranchise 
has emerged as an innovative business model with high potential to scale up 
entrepreneurship at the BOP to co-create value with those entrepreneurs and contribute to 
public goods and poverty eradication (Fairbourne, 2007). Microfranchising is a variant of 
the traditional franchising approach, which is a contractual arrangement in which one firm, 
the franchisor, licenses a business concept, operational system, or trademark to a second 
firm, the franchisee. For the franchisor, franchising is typically a growth strategy utilized 
to expand across geographic markets while overcoming agency concerns and capital 
constraints associated with internal growth (Combs & Ketchen, 1999a, 1999b). For the 
franchisee, franchising offers the benefits of operating one’s own business with the 
mitigation of risks, facilitated by being able to leverage the franchisor’s proven brand and 
standardized business format (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kistruck et al., 2011). 
While Microfranchising has many commonalities with the traditional franchising 
model, the intrinsic orientation to create social good and the wellbeing of the franchisees 
  
 
8 
in the BOP market is one key difference between both models. The term “micro” also 
connotes a number of distinctions with the traditional franchise model. One such difference 
is the fact that the emerging model is being adapted to BOP market and tends to be at 
smaller scale (Fairbourne, 2007). For instance, initial investments by microfranchisees 
typically do not exceed more than $1,500 (Lehr, 2008). Furthermore, microfranchisors 
often convert existing micro-entrepreneurs with their past ties and practices into a new 
network. The emergent business continues to evolve, improved, standardized, packaged 
and ready to be scaled up for rapid adoption by interested BOP entrepreneurs. This is the 
approach taken by CARE in Bangladesh in the agriculture and food sector to enable 
millions of BOP farmers to access affordable and quality agriculture input and services in 
a sustainable and timely manner. In doing so, CARE has to forge and orchestrate a number 
of partnerships upstream as well as downstream to co-create value.  
Existing research on microfranchising focuses almost exclusively on the potential 
social benefits to the local communities, and even more so to the microfranchisee—the 
opportunities for job creation (Christensen et al.), the reduced risk from buying into a 
“proven business system” (Fairbourne), and the benefits of belonging to part of a 
“democratic network” (Magleby, 2007, p. 46). There is no existing research on how an 
intermediary entity such as CARE can design and orchestrate such networks of actors 
through the concept of microfranchise to innovate at the BOP market and to co-create value 
with various stakeholders involved. Furthermore, there is no empirical research on 
strategies and tactics used to manage and leverage the past and current tie of those 
entrepreneurs to achieve the outcome of the new network.  
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Against this backdrop, our goal is to understand how does an organization, in this 
case CARE, design and orchestrate an embedded microfranchise innovation network to 
facilitate the timely provision of affordable and quality agriculture inputs and services to 
BOP farmers in Bangladesh. Specifically, we draw on the concept of orchestration of 
innovation network developed by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and combine it with the 
concept of network imprinting (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) to understand such phenomena. 
To gain empirical evidence, we conducted a longitudinal case study on the microfranchise 
network in Bangladesh.  
III.1 Theoretical Framework  
The orchestration of the innovation network framework developed by (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006) focuses on how a hub as coordinator can improve outcomes by facilitating 
interactions between the firms and institutions involved in a network. The idea here is that 
firms are part of a network to create or benefit from innovation, and there is a strong role 
needed from a central firm to manage the network and ensure that knowledge gets created 
and distributed in the network and its members benefit. This central firm, called the hub, 
is defined as one that possesses prominence (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994) and power 
(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) gained through individual attributes and a central position in 
the network structure, and that uses its prominence and power to perform a leadership role 
in pulling together dispersed resources and the capabilities of network members (Dhanaraj 
& Parkhe, 2006).  
The network of focus for this framework is viewed as loosely coupled. This means 
that participant firms in the network retain some autonomy and their identity while 
remaining responsive and in some cases accountable to the network (Weick, 1976). Being 
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able to orchestrate such a network to achieve the expected outcome is therefore critical. 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe define network orchestration as a set of deliberate purposeful actions 
undertaken by the hub firm as it seeks to create value, (expand the pie) and extract value 
(gain a larger slice of the pie) from the network (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). In the particular 
context of innovation networks, “where knowledge is the chief currency and is dispersed,” 
the first task of orchestration for the hub firm is to ensure that knowledge is mobile within 
the network. This is called knowledge mobility. Two other key processes are part of the 
orchestration of innovation network function: managing innovation appropriability and 
network stability. In addition to these functions, the hub firm has to ensure that the network 
is properly designed. Figure 2 helps visualize the network orchestration framework that is 
the theoretical backbone of our research (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). We discussed in 
depth in the next section a few important concepts relevant for our research.  
III.1.1 Network design 
Three important design issues are related to network design: membership, structure, 
and position (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).  
Network membership defines who can join or cannot join the network. It is a minimum 
agreement defined by the network members under the leadership of the hub firm. The size 
and diversity of the network and the value and knowledge potential to its members are all 
critical elements (Levén, Holmström & Mathiassen, 2014).  
Network structure is comprised of network density and autonomy. Network density, refers 
to the degree of formal and informal relations amongst members that keep the network 
together. A hub can change network density by developing existing relations, by 
establishing new promising relations, and by recruiting new organizations that already have 
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relations with existing members. A hub can impact network autonomy through the way it 
recruits members and by designing structures that enable collaboration (Levén et al., 2014).  
Finally, network position refers to the centrality, confidence and status ascribed to 
the hub by the network members. These qualities are primarily reflected in the network 
members’ perception of the hub’s performance as both network designer and orchestrator. 
Hence, the hub can impact its position by effectively communicating the virtues of the 
network and the value-adding role the hub is playing as designer and orchestrator of the 
network (Levén et al., 2014).  
III.1.2 Network orchestration: 
Network orchestration has to deal with three main processes:  managing knowledge 
mobility, managing innovation appropriability, and managing network stability.   
Knowledge mobility is defined as the ease with which knowledge is shared, 
acquired and deployed within the network. (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). The hub firm has 
a central role to play in ensuring that any knowledge created is assessed for its relevance 
and is transferred in a timely fashion to different parts of the network where it is relevant. 
Managing innovation appropriability ensures that value is distributed equitably and 
perceived as such by network members. The hub can ensure innovation appropriability and 
an equitable distribution of value through trust, procedural justice, and joint asset 
ownership. While formal contracts are important, the strength of an appropriability regime 
rests more on social interaction between member firms. Principles of procedural justice 
like “bilateral communications, ability to refute decisions, full account of the final 
decisions and consistency in the decision-making process” (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006, p. 
663) are examples of how the hub can support knowledge mobility by strengthening 
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innovation appropriability (Levén et al., 2014).  Finally, ensuring network stability, even 
when the network is loosely coupled remains very important and strategic to avoid network 
disintegration. The hub firm can increase network stability by first enhancing the network 
reputation. This can be done through a common identity or strong branding. Second, the 
hub can fortify reciprocal behavior by being an effective promoter of collaboration in 
which network members can anticipate a future benefit by collaborating together in the 
present situation (Parkhe, 1993). Third, a hub can build robust relations by building 
multiplexity, by fostering multiple collaborations between members themselves and 
between members and hub firms (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).   
 
Figure 2: Network orchestration framework (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006) 
 
Current and future network members, including shops owners, supplier firms and 
other institutions who will integrate into the microfranchise network each come with their 
own imprint. This means each member of the network has pre-established social and 
business related ties and practices prior to joining the microfranchise network. In order to 
effectively design and orchestrate the microfranchise innovation network, CARE as the 
hub firm, should not ignore this imprinting phenomenon and should develop strategies and 
tactics to manage and leverage it. 
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The concept of imprinting emerged more than a century ago in studies of animal 
behavior (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). Stinchcombe pioneered the concept in 
organizational studies in his classic essay of 1965 on “Social Structure and Organizations”, 
although he did not use the term directly according to many authors including Lounsbury 
and Ventresca, 2002. Marquis and Tilcsik defined the term imprinting as a process 
whereby, during a brief period of susceptibility, a focal entity develops characteristics that 
reflect prominent features of the environment, and these characteristics continue to persist 
despite significant environmental changes in subsequent periods. Three essential concepts 
emerge from this definition:  
- The existence of a temporally restricted sensitive period characterized by high 
susceptibility of environmental influence;  
- The powerful impact of the environment during the sensitive period such that the 
focal entity comes to reflect elements of the environment at that time; and  
- The persistence of the characteristics developed during the sensitive period even in 
the face of subsequent environmental changes.  
Weaving the network imprinting into the orchestration of innovation network 
theory would give us an opportunity to understand how the past ties of the current and 
future members of the network would play out to achieve the goal of this new business 
model. As noted by Marquis and Tilcsik (2013), this analysis will allow us to understand 
the lingering influence of past network structures and positions. They suggested two areas 
of attention that we will also consider in addition to the key concepts presented in Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe’s framework.    
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1- The importance of past ties among network members and structural positions on 
the current microfranchise network  
2- The network persistence, whereby the structure of a network bears imprint of 
conditions that prevailed during relevant sensitive period, such that network 
interactions are reproduced over time and across a number of actors (Ahuja et al. 
2012).  
Taking into account these two essential elements in our research would help us to 
understand how past ties, structural positions and network persistence could cast an 
influential shadow over the current and innovative approach CARE has introduced. This 
would also help to understand how the imprinting is managed and leveraged to enable 
hundreds of thousands of BOP farmers to timely access quality and affordable agriculture 
inputs and services in Bangladesh.  
Table 2 summarizes key concepts in the orchestration of innovation network and 
network imprinting theory and the next sections present the research method, timelines, 
key contributions we expect to make and how our dissertation will be structured.  
IV THEORETICAL MOTIVATION  
 Dhanaraj & Parkhe (2006) developed a relevant framework for our research to 
analyze the microfranchise network that CARE is orchestrating in Bangladesh to provide 
timely access to affordable, quality input and services to BOP farmers. We think that 
theoretically it is important to test this framework within the microfranchise model to 
improve the understanding of how the network is built and orchestrated. However, we 
anticipate some modification of this framework due to several reasons that vary from a 
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typical business where profit maximization is the main driver. Some of the differences we 
anticipate are specific to our research setting include:  
- First, our research setting, in this case, the BOP context, is characterized by 
limited financial resources, weak human capacity, poor infrastructures and a 
weak legal framework.   
- Second, the outcomes pursued by CARE as a social enterprise go beyond 
innovation output. Given the innovative nature of microfranchising as a new 
business model in the BOP space to standardize business practices and to reach 
scale and efficiency, CARE’s goal is also to co-create values between the 
microfranchisees and the population they serve.  
- Third, a characteristic of the microfranchise network is that the hub firm, in this 
case CARE, is not in profit maximization mode, although achieving financial 
sustainability is important. Therefore, CARE might orchestrate the innovation 
network in a different way from a pure business perspective. 
- Finally, we anticipate the network imprinting to play a role that could influence 
how the network is designed and orchestrated. The network imprinting was not 
part of the orchestration of the innovation network theory proposed by Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe, 2006.    
Given all the reasons provided above, our empirical study will help to contribute to 
answering the question: how does the network design and orchestration process differ from 
the one proposed by Dhanaraj and Parkhe, and what modification could therefore be 
proposed?  
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Table 2: key constructs in orchestration of innovation network 
Themes Concepts Sub concepts 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Design  
Network membership - Network size   
- Network diversity 
Network structure - Network density 
- Network autonomy 
- Ties among members  
Network position Status ascribed to the hub by the network members such 
as:  
- Centrality   
- Confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Orchestration  
Managing knowledge 
mobility 
- Knowledge management absorption  
- Network identification 
- Inter-organizational socialization 
Managing innovation 
appropriability 
- Trust 
- Procedural justice 
- Joint asset ownership 
Managing network 
stability  
- Enhancing reputation 
- Lengthening the shadow of the future 
- Building multiplexity 
Network 
Performance 
Hub firm  Lead firm orchestrating network of loosely coupled 
members.  
Network innovation 
output 
Could be: 
- Technological innovation,  
- Financial returns,  
- Process improvement,  
- and positive impact on targeted population 
Network 
Imprinting  
Past ties - Weak past tie 
- Moderate past tie 
- Strong tie  
Structural position - Dominant position 
- Lower position 
- Bridging position  
Network persistence  Level of change in: 
- Behavior 
- Practice  
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V METHODOLOGY: LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY DESIGN 
Grounded in an interpretative research philosophy, we decided to adopt a 
longitudinal in-depth case study method, based on a number of considerations. First, 
multiple data sources and theory-driven data analysis are key characteristics of case study 
research (Yin, 2003), and we have access to very rich data about the design and 
orchestration of the microfranchise network that CARE is leading in Bangladesh. Second, 
the case study method has a distinct advantage in situations when how or why questions 
are being asked about events over which the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 2003). 
Our investigation was driven by a question based on retrospective and current analysis of 
events that had, and still are, shaping how the microfranchise network is being developed. 
Finally we took an engaged scholarship approach drawing from Van de Ven (2007), which 
promotes a participatory form of research for obtaining the views of the key stakeholders 
to understand a complex problem or case. Our end goal was to promote knowledge that is 
more penetrating and insightful for both practice and theory.   
V.1 Data collection 
Our data collection approach sought to capture information from various 
perspectives within and outside the microfranchise network in Bangladesh and through 
various modes to (a) avoid biases resulting from social desirability or from using a single 
perspectives (Kistruck et al. 2015) and (b) develop a comprehensive empirical account and 
a framework to explain why and how CARE designed and orchestrated a microfranchise 
network to co-create value. We collected data in Bangladesh and in North America from 
various sources. Our data collection attempted to understand the baseline situation to 
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uncover pre-existing conditions in terms of past ties, practices and positions before CARE 
introduced the microfranchise network. At its core, data collection focused on the activities 
and conditions under which the network has been designed and orchestrated, and on the 
challenges and results that have emerged during the process. We also kept in mind the end 
state that CARE, the network designer, and the orchestrator sought to achieve. Our data 
collection covered January 2010 through December 2015. This gave us nearly six years of 
process data for our research. Figure 3 depicts the various stages of the development of the 
microfranchise network. Those four stages became evident during our data analysis. We 
also made use of any relevant document and archival data collected by CARE and the 
Krishi Utsho network in Bangladesh, such as the business plan, proposals submitted for 
funding, progress reports, the baseline study, the market research report, meeting notes, the 
contract agreement, trip reports, monitoring and evaluation reports and other relevant 
documents. We also collected field observations. We secured approval from the 
Institutional Review Board of Georgia State University in May 2015.  
We collected data in two waves to obtain an in-depth perspective of the network 
and to be able to thoroughly analyze the data. This enabled us to respond to our research 
question and to gain insights to develop a framework to contribute to practice and theory. 
The first field data collection took place in June 2015 in Bangladesh. The first data 
collection was in the form of semi-structured interviews targeted to the key constructs we 
have outlined in this research proposal. After coding and the first data analysis, we 
narrowed down the key questions we wanted to research further and conducted the second 
wave of data collection, mostly with the leadership of the Krishi Utsho network in 
Bangladesh and other key informants able to provide insights to inform our research. This 
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iterative approach helped us to refine our questions and to ensure that we had rich and 
targeted data for our research.  
 
Figure 3:  Visualization of the process that will be central to data collection 
The study population is the key stakeholders of Krishi Utsho. We interviewed a 
total of 28 people. Three of them were interviewed again in the second wave. Seven of the 
people interviewed were Krishi Utsho employees, and two were ex-CARE staff who were 
involved at the very beginning of the network, at the Ideation and Creation Stage as well 
as the Development and Launch stage. We also interviewed one CARE Bangladesh 
employee. On the franchisees’ side, we interviewed three franchisees from the 
Development and Launch Stage and four who joined the network in the Growth and 
Reconfiguration stage. On the supplier side, we interviewed all of the eight suppliers 
currently involved in the network. We interviewed high-level representatives, such as the 
CEO and the Regional Sales Directors for each supplier firm. A prominent financial 
institution in Bangladesh, that Krishi Utsho had attempted to finance the network with, was 
also interviewed. A representative of a competitor network of agro-dealer franchisees in 
Bangladesh was also interviewed. A shop owner with similar characteristics to the one that 
Krishi Utsho selected to join the network was also interviewed. Table 3 presents the list of 
various stakeholders we interviewed and the number of interviews we conducted with 
them.  
 
Stage 1: 
Ideation &   
Creation 
(2010-2012)
Stage 2
Development 
& Launch 
(2012-2013)
Stage 3: 
Growth & 
Reconfiguration 
(2013-2014)
Stage 4: 
Consolidation 
and Expansion
(2015-to date)
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Table 3: List and numbers of stakeholders interviewed 
Category of interviews # of 
interview: 
Wave 1 
# of 
interview: 
Wave 2 
# of 
hours 
CARE staff (current and ex) 3 1 7h  
Krishi Utsho staff 7 2 13h  
Franchisees 7 0 7h 
Suppliers 8 0 8h 
Competitions 2 0 3h  
Partner 1 0 1h  
Total # of interviews 28 3 39h  
All the first wave interviews were conducted in the field in Bangladesh. The second 
wave interviews were conducted through Skype, with interviewees in North America and 
Bangladesh. Each interview lasted about an hour, with a few exceptions. Given the 
qualitative nature of this case study, we are not concerned about generalization to a broader 
population.  
The research team worked with the leadership of Krishi Utsho to select the research 
participants to be interviewed. The general manager of Krishi Utsho and his deputy were 
our main points of contact for the discussion and the selection of the research participants. 
Once the participants were selected and agreed upon between us, the researcher reached 
out to them via an official letter to notify them of their selection to participate in the study. 
We sent an official letter requesting the interviewees to participate in the study in no 
coercive manner. The letter clearly stated that participation was completely voluntary. The 
official letter from the researcher appended a letter from the general manager of Krishi 
Utsho explaining the agreement between Krishi Utsho and the researcher to conduct this 
study, and it stated the goal of the research, the expected outcomes and it thanked the 
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participants in advance. The research participants all signed an informed consent form 
before they could be interviewed.  
We reviewed all archival, process and research data available on Krishi Utsho. We also 
collected and analyzed any relevant secondary sources of information on Krishi Utsho and 
on the research question and theories of interest for this study. In total, we reviewed 
thousand pages of documents on Krishi Utsho and on the research questions and theories.  
V.2 Data analysis  
We followed Miles, Huberman and Saldana’s (2013) advice to concurrently 
interweave data collection and data analysis from the start. We also followed their guidance 
on the three iterative steps in data analysis, including (1) data condensation, (2) data 
display, and (3) conclusion drawing/verification (Figure 4). Data condensation, also known 
as data reduction, is “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming the data that appears in the full corpus of written-up field notes, interview 
transcripts, documents, and other empirical materials” (2013, p12). To that end, we kept a 
complete repository of primary and secondary data, and we generated codes according to 
key constructs identified in the theoretical framing, developed themes, identified 
categories, and wrote analytical memos and summaries. Data condensation helped us to 
sharpen, sort, focus, discard, and organize data in such a way that final conclusions were 
drawn and could be verified. 
Data display is “an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing and action” (Miles et al., 2013, p12). To support this analysis step, we 
used graphs, tables, and flowcharts to visualize the most significant findings from our data. 
Using a graphic representation similar to the one used by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) 
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helped us understand how the microfranchise network is designed and orchestrated and 
how it is similar or different from the one presented in our theoretical framework. In the 
two steps above, we made good use of Nvivo software to condense, code, display and 
interpret our data.  
The final data analysis step of drawing conclusions and verification, includes 
“identifying patterns, explanations, causal flows and propositions from available data” 
(Miles et al., 2013, p13). We held our conclusion lightly, maintaining openness and 
skepticism until we were confident our conclusion was verified thoroughly and consistent 
with our data and our findings.  
 
 
Figure 4: Approach to Data Analysis (adopted from Singh, 2011) 
V.3 Coding Data 
To code our data, we developed a coding scheme based on our theoretical framework, 
which in this case involved the orchestration of innovation network theory, as well as 
network imprinting theory. We also drew from the bottom of the pyramid and 
microfranchise literature, which is our area of concern, to inform our coding scheme. We 
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borrowed from the six principles of coding proposed by Cousins et al. (2007) to develop 
and test our coding scheme. The six principles are:  
1. Each quote must be self-contained and as brief as possible. In other words, the 
quote should be concise yet expansive enough that it does not require additional 
interpretation in order to code it.  
2. Do not include all possible quotes. Code selectively to include quotes that: 
a. speak directly to the theory, or  
b. have high relevance to the case. 
3. Strive for consistent coding practices. 
4. Apply a 2-pass coding scheme: 
a. 1st pass: code among 4 high-level constructs (e.g. 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0) 
b. 2nd pass: assign low level codes (e.g. 1.1, 2.2, etc.). 
5. Where applicable, use multiple codes.  
6. Apply role code to the speaker only. For example, if one role speaks about 
another role (or another’s view), this is captured by coding the speaker role only. 
First, we worked closely with our dissertation principal advisor over the summer of 
2015 on three occasions to identify, discuss, and agree upon an initial coding scheme 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) based on orchestration of innovation network and imprinting 
theories. We also included the bottom of the pyramid as well as a microfranchise stream of 
literature. The coding scheme we developed includes all the key themes, concepts and sub-
concepts found in the two theories. We provided detailed definitions of each sub-concept 
in Table 4.   
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Second, after developing this initial coding scheme, we test piloted our coding 
scheme. My research advisor and I independently coded a sample interview from the 
empirical data we collected. We then discussed and fine-tuned our coding scheme and 
resolved any disagreements along the way. This process helped solidify our coding scheme 
and increased our confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
25 
Table 4: Coding Scheme 
Themes Concept Sub-concept Definition  
 
 
 
 
Network 
Design  
1.0 
Network membership 
1.1 
Network size   
Network diversity 
Network membership defines the size and 
diversity of the network and the value and 
knowledge potential to its members. 
Membership can be captured in rules about 
who can and cannot join the network. 
Network structure 
1.2 
Network density 
Network autonomy 
Density is about the degree of formal or 
informal relations amongst the members.  
Autonomy refers to the degree to which 
members can take actions without the 
permission of someone in control of the 
network. Autonomy impacts the degree to 
which members can affect network structure. 
Network position 
1.3 
Centrality   
Status 
Centrality, confidence and status ascribed to 
the hub by the network members. 
These qualities are primarily reflected in the 
network members’ perception of the hub’s 
performance as network designer and 
orchestrator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Orchestration 
2.0  
Managing knowledge 
mobility 
2.1 
Knowledge management 
absorption  
Network identification 
Inter-organizational socialization 
The ease with which knowledge is shared, 
acquired and deployed within the network.  
Managing innovation 
appropriability 
2.2 
Trust 
Procedural justice 
Joint asset ownership 
Ensuring value created is distributed equitably 
and perceived as such by network members.  
Managing network 
stability  
2.3 
Enhancing reputation 
Lengthening the shadow of the 
future 
Building multiplexity 
Prevent network to become eroded, 
disintegrated and ensuring network dynamic 
stability 
Network 
Performance  
3.0 
Hub firm  
3.1 
 The performance of the lead firm orchestrating 
the network. Key performance metrics are 
timeliness and quality of services delivered by 
hub firm to network members.  
Network innovation 
output 
3.2 
 This is the result of the network innovation 
such as technological innovation, financial 
returns, process improvement, and impact on 
targeted population.  
Network 
Imprinting  
4.0 
Alternate Network 
4.1 
Weak tie 
Moderate tie 
Strong tie 
This includes past and current ties, formal and 
informal.  
Structural position 
4.2 
Dominant position 
Lower position 
Bridging position 
This is the position of the network members in 
alternate network.  
Network persistence 
4.3  
Level of change in:  
- Behavior 
- Practice 
Level of change (behavior and practice) 
between previous network and new network 
established 
Content 
5.0 
BOP 
5.1 
Poor farmer 
Illiterate  
Marginalized 
Vulnerable  
People living at the base of the economic 
pyramid. They are usually the poor making 
less than $2 per day 
Microfranchising 
5.2 
Microfranchisors 
Microfranchisees 
A variant of franchising but with focus on 
achieving social impact as well as scaling up 
entrepreneurship at the base of the pyramid 
Speaker 
5.3 
CARE/Krishi Utsho staff, 
suppliers,  
Franchisees or shop owners 
Partners, and Others 
These are the people interviewed.  
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Third, we discussed how to use our coding scheme and coded a sample of interviews in 
order to further refine our coding scheme and reach the acceptable level of inter-coder 
reliability (using Cohen’s). 
Fourth, my advisor and I manually coded three samples of our interview transcripts and 
compared notes and calculated the inter-coder reliability. We coded transcripts of the 
interview from a Krishi Utsho staff, a franchisee and a supplier. In our first attempt, we 
reached an inter-coder reliability of 57%. After further refinement of the coding schemes 
and two other attempts, we increased the inter-coder reliability to 90% which is above the 
88% level recommended by Cohen. With this high level of inter-coder reliability achieved, 
we fine-tuned our coding scheme. The final coding scheme developed (Table 4) was then 
created in Nvivo 10. Each of the transcripts was imported into Nvivo 10 and coded 
according to the scheme. Any contextual information that did not fit the theoretical 
framework was also identified.  
 
  
  
 
27 
VI ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
In this chapter we report the analysis of our empirical data as well as all the 
secondary data. We organize this chapter in four sections following the four temporal 
stages identified during the analysis of our data.  We summarize the findings following our 
theoretical framework in a table after each stage.   
VI.1 2010-2012: Ideation and Creation  
The idea of creating a microfranchise network to provide timely access to quality 
and affordable agriculture input and services to the dairy BOP farmers in Bangladesh 
emerged in late 2010, two years after CARE started implementing the Strengthening the 
Dairy Value Chain (SDVC) project with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. The SDVC project aims at improving the livelihoods of 35,000 rural BOP 
farmers, who are small holder and landless households in nine districts of north and 
northwest Bangladesh, by enhancing their participation in and profit from the dairy value 
chain.  
VI.1.1 Challenges faced by BOP farmers: 
To achieve the goal of the five year SDVC project, which later was extended for 
another four years (2008-2016), CARE had to find innovative solutions to ensure that BOP 
farmers have timely access to quality and affordable dairy input and services on a 
sustainable basis. The microfranchise network came about after a number of trial and errors 
attempted by CARE to solve the systemic constraints faced by the BOP farmers in 
Bangladesh. BOP dairy farmers particularly needed access to four types of inputs: (1) 
quality products such as feed and medicines for their livestock; (2) services such as animal 
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health care and artificial insemination; (3) long-term services such as improved breed 
development, and (4) financial services.  
VI.1.2 CARE’s early trial and errors  
CARE attempted many solutions to address the issues. One significant attempt was 
training community veterinarians—which CARE baptized as Livestock Health Workers 
(LHWs). These LHWs are community members with a high school degree who are trained 
on animal health issues and act as the first line of response before a professional 
veterinarian can be reached. They provide service on fee basis and carry feed and other 
animal health products that BOP farmers could avail. CARE also trained women in the 
community who sell door to door to be part of the dairy input distribution. A special three-
wheeled bicycle was commissioned to enable women to transport feed, but they could not 
sell enough volume to keep them interested in the new venture. Many other approaches 
were used by CARE to solve the systemic issues faced by BOP farmers, but none of them 
worked as expected. According to Kevin McKague and Siddiquee Muhammad (2014), 
“CARE attempted multiple, simultaneous initiatives to bring feed and medicines to farmers, 
but their early attempts met with little success. In the first two years of the project, all of 
CARE’s experiments failed to make quality balanced feed rations available and accessible 
to smallholder farmers.”  
The failure of the trials conducted by the SDVC project staff did not discourage 
them from continuing to look for other possible ways to provide timely access to quality 
and affordable input and services to the BOP farmers. In the words of the CARE USA 
Senior Technical Advisor who provided technical assistance to the project in Bangladesh, 
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“as we began to train more producers, there was increase in demand… we quickly found 
that entrepreneurs were stepping in opening shops near our project intervention areas. 
Some of them are input shop owners; others are LHWs who we trained. Hence, we ended 
up with a large universe of players who are suddenly interested in selling input to BOP 
farmers in our project area.” This was a good indication that a market was developing 
organically based on project efforts. This spurred attention and discussion among CARE 
staff.  
VI.1.3 Early stage assessment and results:  
CARE conducted a detailed assessment of the emerging model to understand the 
opportunity and how it could be leveraged. As stated by the Senior Technical Advisor, “we 
undertook a very detailed assessment of the input suppliers. We mapped out their strengths 
and weaknesses. We covered over 150 livestock input providers. From this, we decided to 
hone in on a specific model closer to the behavior we would like to promote. Part of the 
model we had in mind was to develop a standard protocol for efficiency, quality, 
aggregation, branding and common marketing platform.”  
Initially though, CARE did not think of a franchise model. The assessment 
uncovered four major challenges that the emerging input suppliers faced. The first 
challenge was low quality of the feed and medicine. Many input providers abused their 
customers and were driven by higher profit. In the words of one franchisee member of the 
network, “many practitioners lure farmers with different low quality products. I try to 
convince farmers about the quality of my products. The price is higher, but the product is 
better.” The national and multinational companies in the agriculture input supply chain in 
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Bangladesh also recognized this low quality product issue as one of their top challenges. 
One multinational company executive in the agriculture input business indicated that 
“many local companies just don’t care about the quality of their products and the long 
term value of their companies. Most of them have unethical practices and offer cheap 
products for low quality to farmers. Worse, the Government does not have a quality control 
system in place.” Addressing this low quality issue is part of the Krishi Utsho’s vision as 
confirmed by the Manager of the network, “our vision is very simple. It is making quality 
agro-input products accessible to marginalized farmers in Bangladesh.” The second 
challenge was lack of trust. As a result of the low quality products which dominated the 
market, there was a lack of trust between BOP farmers and the input providers since the 
BOP farmers are, in majority, illiterate and cannot differentiate quality feeds and medicine 
from those which are counterfeited. The third challenge was a fragmented supply chain, 
especially for feed and other non-medical products between the input providers at the 
community level and the private sector firms with inefficiency and lack of economies of 
scale. Finally, the fourth challenge was professionalization and long-term viability of the 
small-scale shops as they often lacked the adequate working capital, training in 
bookkeeping, basic business management, customer service and marketing.  
At the same time, the CARE team found that there were opportunities that could be 
leveraged to address the major constraints and ensure timely provision of quality and 
affordable agriculture input and services to BOP farmers. One important opportunity that 
could be leveraged was the fact that CARE is embedded in the local communities, has a 
well-known brand which makes CARE a trustworthy player with the BOP farmers, the 
input suppliers, the shop owners and the society at large. Another opportunity was the 
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recent creation and spin off of a similar social enterprise in Bangladesh by CARE and 
Danone called “Jita”, which is a network of sales women going door to door to sell fast 
moving consumer goods using a hub and spoke model and a franchise-type approach to 
brand all the sales women in the same fashion and to standardize their operations. At the 
same time, CARE USA, which is the legal entity on which the office in Bangladesh 
depends, also created a separate for profit entity called CARE Enterprise Inc. as a holding 
company for social enterprises CARE creates around the world. The combination of these 
two ventures inspired the CARE SDVC project team to create a sustainable mechanism to 
provide quality and affordable input to BOP farmers outside of the life of the SDVC 
project. As final and obvious opportunity, there was a growing demand among BOP 
farmers for quality products and the goal pursued by CARE in its SDVC project was to 
double the income of the selected BOP farmers. Table 5 summarizes challenges and 
opportunities uncovered during the assessment.  
Table 5: Challenges and opportunities identified during the assessment 
Identified challenges Identified opportunities  
 Low quality agriculture input and services 
 Lack of trust between BOP farmers and 
community input suppliers 
 Fragmented supply chain, especially for 
feed and non-medical products 
 Lack of professionalization and long term 
viability of shop owners due to 
inappropriate working capital, weak 
capacity of shop owners in management, 
marketing and customer services 
 CARE’s embeddedness in local market 
and good reputation 
 Recent creation of a social enterprise spin-
off entities by CARE in Bangladesh and 
CARE Enterprise Inc. by CARE USA 
 Growing demand for quality agriculture 
input among BOP farmers 
 CARE’s mandate to double the income of 
dairy BOP farmers and extend a time-
bound project 
VI.1.4 Ideating and creating the early stage business model:  
The better understanding of the challenges and opportunities by CARE’s staff 
generated brainstorming and ideation of a business model that could be put in motion. As 
recounted by the Deputy Manager of the network who joined CARE around the same time 
the network was created, “we were thinking of mechanism to deliver timely and quality 
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input to the BOP farmers and to be able to cover operational costs and make some profit. 
From that idea, there were few options that were in front of CARE: establish our own shops 
or adopt the JITA hub-spoke model. So after evaluating every idea, we found that the 
franchise network would be most effective for a business environment like Bangladesh. 
Because in that case what Krishi Utsho has to do is to show competitive advantage over 
others, so it has to establish some control mechanism over the franchisees and then be a 
social enterprise which can run on its own.” The Senior Technical Advisor of CARE USA 
was the most influential person in inspiring the project team and other stakeholders in 
CARE to consider the franchise model. He had prior experience from conducting an in-
depth assessment of a similar microfranchise model in the health sector in Kenya and he 
had also contributed a book chapter on the model.  
Hence, in early 2011 CARE decided to create a microfranchise pilot within the 
SDVC project. CARE submitted a business value proposition and a funding request to a 
small family foundation in April 2011 in Atlanta, USA to complement funding from the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provided to the SDVC project. CARE also submitted 
an application to the MAP program of the Ross School of Business of the University of 
Michigan in late 2011 to get support from MBA students to further study and conceptualize 
the franchise model given this was the first time CARE embarked on such venture and its 
novelty in the BOP context in Bangladesh. Both proposals submitted by CARE were 
approved which gave the CARE team the impetus to start a small pilot within the SDVC 
project.  
The CARE team took a “learning by doing” approach to design and orchestrate the 
microfranchise network. The study conducted by the MBA students from the University of 
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Michigan was very helpful in analyzing the landscape; hearing from the potential 
franchisees and suppliers and the BOP farmers; and, helping to refine the microfranchise 
concept. As a result, the CARE team carefully considered how to design the microfranchise 
network so it was scalable from products and services portfolio as well as geographical 
expansion perspectives.  
Designing a brand and selecting a name that sent a strong message to farmers in 
Bangladesh about the quality and reliability of the network was also part of the early 
activities. The CARE team, with the help of professional consultants, designed nine 
different logos with different names, collected feedback from more than 200 farmers and 
shops owners, and refined the logos and names focusing on the ones that represented the 
ideal of what farmers wanted to see in the network. The selected logo is an iconic symbol 
of trust to signal to the market that the microfranchise network cares strongly about quality 
and reliability in a crowded market place where counterfeited animal products and 
medicines are the norm. The logo was also chosen because it would be difficult to imitate, 
which was an important consideration in a country with few protections on intellectual 
property. The branding adopted by the CARE team with input from potential franchisees 
also meant to signal that the shops are part of a larger infrastructure that goes beyond their 
individual footprint. The name Krishi Utsho in Bengali, which is the national language of 
Bangladesh, means “Agri-source”. The name symbolizes a place where BOP farmers can 
find a variety of quality agriculture products and services, not only for livestock. As 
represented on the logo, there are fish, poultry, crop and other types of agriculture input 
along with livestock on the logo.  
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Figure 5: Krishi Utsho logo, photo credit of Krishi Utsho 
The key network design, network orchestration, network performance and network 
imprinting characteristics of this first episode are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Innovation Networking during the Ideation and Creation Stage  
Network 
Design 
Network Orchestration Network Performance Network 
Imprinting 
 Initial assessment as 
basis for network 
design  
 Better understanding of 
challenges faced by 
BOP farmers and 
opportunities for 
innovative solutions 
 Development and 
approval of value 
proposition and 
funding proposal  
 Development of logo 
and branding 
 There was no 
network 
orchestration at this 
stage 
 First goal was timely 
access to quality and 
affordable livestock 
input and services for 
BOP farmers 
 Second goal was 
financial viability of 
the network and its 
members 
 Lack of trust 
between BOP 
farmers and 
suppliers (firms and 
shop owners) 
 No prior experience 
in designing and 
orchestrating a 
microfranchise 
network at CARE.  
 Input shop owners 
and suppliers not 
organized in any 
formal network  
 LHWs network was 
tapped to be part of 
the microfranchise 
network  
 
VI.2 2012-2013: Development and Launch  
Based on a strong logo and branding, a tested value proposition, and approved 
funding for the Krishi Utsho microfranchise network, the SDVC Project Management 
tasked a team of ten people within the SDVC project staff to further develop the concept 
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and launch the network in 2012. Hence, staying true to the “learning by doing” approach, 
the SDVC team did not wait to develop a fully-fledged business plan and to secure all the 
required funding before launching a small pilot under the auspices of the SDVC project. 
Accordingly, the team mobilized all resources and assets they could get to support the 
development and launch of the network.  
VI.2.1 Recruiting the first fifteen franchisees: 
The first task was the selection of the first fifteen shops among the over 150 shops 
surveyed and convert them as franchisees as part of the Krishi Utsho microfranchise 
network. The team thought fifteen shops was a reasonable number to start with and learn 
from to demonstrate proof of concept. The team made an important decision to start the 
pilot in Bogra and Rangpur districts which are affluent dairy hubs in Northern Bangladesh. 
Both were also an important geography in the SDVC project. This decision made it 
somewhat easier for the SDVC team to narrow down the list of shops. Other criteria used 
to select the first shops were:  
1. Have an existing outlet in the targeted geographical location  
2. Be a trained livestock health worker 
3. Carry feed and medicine in demand by the targeted BOP farmers  
4. Shop located in an easy proximity to BOP farmers participating in the SDVC 
project 
5. Interest in joining the microfranchise network and being compliant of its rules. 
Krishi Utsho continued to refine its value proposition for the prospective franchises as well 
as for suppliers, the BOP farmers and current and future funders in the development and 
launch stage. Most specifically for franchisees, Krishi Utsho’s proposal was four fold. 
First, facilitate a better access to a wide range of quality and cost-effective agriculture input 
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and services suppliers, not only for dairy livestock, but also fishery, poultry, crop protection 
and seed, financial services and agriculture equipment. Second, strengthen the input and 
services supply chain to make it more efficient and inclusive and drive down cost to ensure 
competitive prices to BOP farmers. Third, invest continuously in training and knowledge 
sharing to enhance the technical capacity of the franchisees to provide quality services to 
BOP farmers and to professionally manage their business. And finally, build and grow a 
strong customer base for the franchisees to increase their sales volume and profit.  
Once the shop owners were selected, the SDVC team conducted a baseline study 
to further assess their understanding and practice of key concepts including business 
promotion, record keeping, basic business operations, inventory management, quality 
standards, distribution channels and linkages with agro-input suppliers and their readiness 
to be converted. This information helped generate a business profile of each of the sampled 
candidates and fed into Krishi Utsho’s capacity building plan. The selected shops were 
then classified in three categories: category A was shops with great potential who can 
convert within one to two month; category B shops met most of the criteria and could 
convert in less than three months; and, category C shops needed up to six months to 
convert. Once the shops were selected, they were included in the network, even without 
being branded, and Krishi Utsho started doing business with them. This built their capacity 
to get ready for conversion and assessed their readiness via a formal assessment. As 
testified by one of the franchisees, “I was working in the old shop. My level was not good. 
Krishi Utsho took time to see how I was improving. This was the testing period. It is like 
gold when you take time to understand its purity. Similarly, Krishi Utsho took the time to 
get to know me and assess if I can join the network.” Figure 6 depicts the selection and 
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conversion process of candidate franchisees that Krishi Utsho followed. The shops also 
had to come up with some financial commitment to invest in improving their business, 
increase their inventory with the anticipated growing demand, and comply with the layout 
and branding protocol. In many instances, the shops had to move to another more 
appropriate store to meet the franchise format introduced by Krishi Utsho (see photos 
below).  
Working alongside the franchisees, the SDVC team used the opportunity to get a 
better understanding of key products in demand by the BOP farmers, key suppliers of the 
shops, and categories of products. Quality standards were an important consideration for 
the SDVC team to ensure that only products on the shelves of the franchisees met the 
required quality because of the major concerns expressed by the BOP farmers and mistrust 
uncovered during the design phase. The SDVC team also used the opportunity to get to 
know the suppliers of the shops, to develop a data base, and to start building relation with 
some of them at the district level as well as at their respective headquarters. This enabled 
the SDVC team to develop an engagement plan with the major suppliers.  
 
Figure 6: Before conversion into Krishi Utsho, photo credit from author 
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Figure 7: After conversion into Krishi Utsho, photo credit from author 
VI.2.2 Recruiting supplier firms: 
Given the low quality issue in the sector and the high commitment by Krishi Utsho 
to quality standards, the hub firm had to meticulously identify and recruit top brand firms 
that could act as suppliers of products and providers of services to the network. To select 
those suppliers, the SDVC team developed criteria to meet the multiple goals pursued by 
the network. They were: (1) quality of the products; (2) firm’s reputation; (3) firms ‘ability 
to provide services like veterinary training to franchisees, and financial incentives such as 
commission to the hub firm; and (4) franchisees’ ability to get product at a competitive 
price. Ultimately, the SDVC team, acting on behalf of Krishi Utsho as the hub firm, also 
kept in mind the interest of the BOP farmers. They used a very detail due diligence process 
to select the top reputable national and multinational firms to become members of the 
network as suppliers and providers of services. The team collected publically available 
information on the firms and when needed, with the help of CARE Corporate Engagement 
Department in Dhaka, the team conducted independent laboratory tests to ensure that the 
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quality of the product is up to standard. The team specifically took this approach with the 
feed companies and relied mostly on rating conducted by government entities and others 
industry bodies with animal medicinal products. 
Conversely, building trust and making a strong value proposition with suppliers 
were also very important as most of them, especially the animal medicine firms already 
had a very robust distribution channel in place and conducted business with many of the 
shops and other competitors such as pharmacies in the same area covered by Krishi Utsho. 
The SDVC team had to make the case that new demand is being generated with BOP 
farmers who were trained by CARE as part of the SDVC project and were now aware of 
the need for quality product. The team also had to demonstrate that many new shops had 
emerged as a result of the increased demand for quality products. Arguing for efficiency 
gains and cost reduction for the suppliers by virtue of working with Krishi Utsho was also 
part of the negotiation process. To convince medicine and feed firms to agree to join the 
network, the SDVC team emphasized during the negotiations that the franchisees were 
committed to uphold the highest quality standards and that they would not prescribe 
expired medicines or counterfeited products. The team traded carefully to protect the new 
emerging opportunity the network was creating. This fear was shared by the Manager of 
the network in these terms: “suppliers and manufacturers are bigger than Krishi Utsho. 
We are careful they don’t grab our business.” Without a proof of concept, however, it was 
difficult for Krishi Utsho to recruit suppliers into the network. Nevertheless, with CARE’s 
reputation in Bangladesh and the value proposition developed, the SDVC team managed 
to recruit three reputable national animal medicine firms as well as one feed company. One 
success in the negotiation was the agreement the team secured with a feed company to meet 
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all the required quality standards of the network, to brand the feed with Krishi Utsho logo 
and make smaller packages to meet the purchasing power of the BOP farmers.  
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Figure 8: Franchisee’s selection and conversion process  modified by author 
Initial launch and early stage orchestration of the network: 
To launch the network at its initial stage, the SDVC team had structured it to 
balance the autonomy of the network members while ensuring adherence to the rules of the 
game and the long term vision of the network. For instance, the SDVC team adopted a 
flexible conversion franchise model which allowed franchisees to continue to buy products 
from their current suppliers as long as they conformed to the established quality standards. 
Franchisees were only selling medicine products prior to joining the network. They also 
carried other medicinal products such as vitamin, concentrate and premix. The team was 
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conscious that it could not substitute immediately all functions fulfilled by the suppliers in 
the network and the extra services they were providing such as veterinary services and 
valuable knowledge on product handling and disease detection. One main reason for this 
flexibility was that many medicine firms had and still have well-developed and robust 
distribution channels in place and have had prior relation with the franchisees. This 
flexibility kept the formal and the informal tie that existed between the suppliers and the 
franchisees in place. Franchisees also had the latitude to purchase medicine products from 
other firms beside the three recruited by the hub firm so long as the quality standards were 
met. Some franchisees indicated, however, that they would be happy to procure all their 
medicines from the hub firm. This is illustrated by one franchisee “I am completely willing 
to buy everything at 100% at some point from Krishi Utsho.” The shelf space occupied by 
Krishi Utsho during the launch period for medicine products ranges between 10% and 20% 
according to the Manager of the network. This flexibility from Krishi Utsho was its way to 
signal to the network members that its priorities were creating increasing value. 
VI.2.3 Getting the first fifteen shops ready for conversion: 
The priority for Krishi Utsho at the Development and Launch stage was to work 
with the fifteen selected shops to get them ready to convert into the branded Krishi Utsho 
franchise network. Getting them ready involved training and coaching on topics ranging 
from microfranchise business operation, business management and technical knowledge in 
animal care and treatment. The training was offered individually as well as collectively. 
The later gave the opportunity to the candidate franchisees to get to know each other and 
develop stronger ties.  
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The SDVC team also leveraged the technical expertise from the medicine firms 
who are members of the network, especially from their veterinarians, to provide technical 
training to the franchisees on various issues such as disease diagnosis, drug prescription, 
and treatment. As stated by one team member, “two things happened; franchisees can 
learn together with the expert how to diagnose disease and this also improved the demand 
side.” In addition to the training, Krishi Utsho also requested the veterinarians to offer 
advice on best products that the franchisees should carry given the types of diseases in their 
community. One rule imposed by Krishi Utsho was to request the veterinarian to prescribe 
only the best products available in the market, not only from the veterinarian’s firm. This 
procedure helped to build a range of products available in the network that BOP farmers 
could avail. It also helped to make knowledge mobile between medicine companies in the 
network, the franchisees and the hub firm. Hence, the network emphasized management of 
knowledge mobility as the success of the pilot hinged on the professionalization of the 
franchisees and the quality and the range of products they could offer the BOP farmers.  
VI.2.4 Creating demand for quality: 
In addition to focusing on the franchisees, the hub firm also extended its reach to 
the BOP farmers by organizing a weekly animal health fair in select communities in the 
vicinities of the fifteen franchisees. The hub firm was deliberate in inviting veterinarians 
from its member medicine firms in the network as well as veterinarians from the local 
government animal health department. BOP farmer communities received training and 
information on how to take better care of their dairy livestock. Feed preparation and 
administration, vaccination and de-worming campaigns were also organized during the 
health fair which gave the opportunity to the franchisees and the medicine and feed 
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companies to promote their products and the Krishi Utsho microfranchise network. These 
weekly events were successful in raising the awareness of the BOP farmers to demand and 
access higher quality products and services for their dairy livestock. This generated 
increased business for the franchisees and the network. The event also provided the 
opportunity to Krishi Utsho to listen to BOP farmers in order to make the network more 
effective in meeting their needs.  
One concrete opportunity that the network created to the BOP farmers was the 
integration between Krishi Utsho and the milk collection points with a view to offer 
payment facilities to farmers who cannot purchase the product in cash. BOP Farmers 
therefore had access to the products on credit and could pay back the franchisees when they 
received payment for their milk on a weekly basis. This innovation introduced by the hub 
firm created value not only for the BOP farmers but also for the dairy industry and the 
network itself. This increased the trust and the loyalty of the BOP farmers and the dairy 
collection points towards the network.  
VI.2.5 Structuring the network:  
From a contractual perspective, the hub did not formalize the relationship with the 
network members through any formal contract. The relation was informal. At launch, the 
hub prioritized the education of the franchisees and convinced them to accept and apply 
the terms and the quality standards of the network over legality. The hub aimed to achieve 
a proof of concept to facilitate diffusion of the network instead of locking its members in 
a legally binding relation at that early stage. In any case, it can be a daunting venture to 
enforce contracts in an embedded and poor setting such as rural Bangladesh with weak rule 
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of law (de Soto, 2000). With the suppliers, the hub had a mixed approach. With some 
suppliers such as the feed company, it has formalized the relation through a contract. With 
the medicine company, the hub only had a letter of collaboration in place.  
VI.2.6 Getting the supply chain right:  
Getting the supply chain right was another important objective the network pursued 
at this early stage as many franchisees faced difficulties with timely access to the right 
quality inventories to serve their customers. However, given the well-developed 
distribution system that many medicine firms already had in rural Bangladesh, Krishi Utsho 
decided to let its franchisees continue to buy directly from them provided the quality 
standards were adhered to. This statement from one representative of a top medicine 
company in Bangladesh illustrates very well the situation: “with the advent of Krishi Utsho, 
we have not yet made any big change in our delivery system. Sometime we deliver through 
Krishi Utsho, but in a large extent we still continue to do business as usual directly with 
the shops.” Nevertheless, the hub firm started to develop its in house supply chain system 
by setting up a small warehouse close to the franchisees in order to fill the supply gaps that 
some of them faced. The volume of medicine carried by the hub firm was very minimal at 
the early stage. However the branded feed with the Krishi Utsho logo was a new product 
and needed a more robust distribution system. Krishi Utsho managed the early stage 
warehouse system with challenges given the high standard CARE’s policy regarding 
warehouse compliance in Bangladesh. To comply with CARE’s rules, Krishi Utsho would 
have to make a substantial investment which it could not afford.  
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VI.2.7 Early stage challenges:  
Orchestrating the network at this early stage posed other additional challenges that 
the hub firm had to manage to maintain its stability. The challenges were three folds, out 
of which one was completely outside the control of the network. The first one was working 
capital. To convert, the franchisees needed an investment of about $3000 on average. For 
many franchisees, this investment was difficult to fund. Although very small, this is a 
typical constraint found in the BOP market (Lehr, 2008). Having a healthy working capital 
became even important as demand started to grow and the franchisees and the franchisor 
needed to carry enough inventories to satisfy the demand. The credit facility to BOP 
farmers introduced by the network also added to the working capital issue. Unfortunately, 
the network did not have requisite financial resources to address the working capital issue, 
nor were the financial institutions in Bangladesh interested in financing the franchise 
network given its early stage and lack of proof of concept and scale. Krishi Utsho had to 
come up with some creative solutions, such as negotiating longer supplier credits with 
medicine and feed firms with some mixed results.  
The second challenge was the low quality products. Although the awareness was 
raised for BOP farmers to demand higher quality products, many medicine and feed 
companies continued to dump counterfeited products in the market and offered higher 
margin to franchisees and the competition. This perverse incentive did not help the end 
consumers with the right products to treat or prevent diseases for their animals which, in 
many cases, are the main source of their cash revenue. Krishi Utsho had to step up its 
efforts to continue to educate the franchisees and the BOP farmers and work alongside the 
top brand companies to increase the margin to the franchisees.  
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The third challenge was the political unrest. Early 2013 involved more than three 
months of political turmoil in Bangladesh with road blockades which paralyzed the entire 
supply chain not only for the Krishi Utsho business but also the entire economy in 
Bangladesh. BOP farmers could not sell their milk as dairy companies could not go to 
remote areas to collect milk. Franchisees could not get their inventories. This represented 
a serious threat to the emerging network. Krishi Utsho had found some creative way to get 
some minimum inventory directly and through its suppliers to the franchisees over the 
weekend and during night time when the situation allowed. Business was reduced to more 
than ¾ of the normal turnover.  
VI.2.8 Managing early stage imprinting:  
As mentioned above, the Krishi Utsho network was characterized by a significant 
level of imprinting that the hub firm had to manage carefully to demonstrate a proof of 
concept to be able to expand and create value. The imprinting of the network could be 
categorized in two, the positive ones that the hub firm strived to leverage to create value 
for its members and the negative ones that the hub firm managed with difficulties to get rid 
of. This also involved consideration of the level of relation or tie that existed between the 
network members prior to their joining the Krishi Utsho network. Three levels of ties were 
found among the members of the network, high, medium and weak.  
A positive imprinting that Krishi Utsho leveraged included the existing strong tie 
between the franchisees and the suppliers. Because the suppliers were already doing 
business with the franchisees before they joined Krishi Utsho, this helped to maintain a 
smooth flow of the inventory from the medicine companies to the selected franchisees. A 
second positive leveraging of the imprinting was the strong tie that existed between the 
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franchisees prior the establishment of the network since the majority of them were trained 
as LHWs by CARE and were part of the informal LHW association facilitated by CARE. 
This strong tie helped Krishi Utsho convey its value proposition to the association and its 
members and convince them to join the network.  
On the flip side, it was difficult to change poor practices, especially as related to 
the fact that many franchisees were selling poor quality animal health products. The 
unprofessional management of the shops was another difficult habit that the new network 
struggled to change on the get go. For instance, many franchisees were not used to keeping 
record of financial transactions or maintaining customer registers. This made it difficult for 
the network to track the business performance of the franchisees and of the network as a 
whole.  
VI.2.9 Early performance:  
Despite all the challenges faced at its beginning, the network was able to show a 
strong performance that helped to build momentum among its stakeholders. First, in 
January 2013, Krishi Utsho was promoted for the first time in public during the ‘Agro 
Technology Fair 2012’ held at Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU), Mymensing. 
This helped to increase the profile of the network and get attention from the government, 
businesses as well as donors. Second, on the business management front, the network 
designed a number of tools, including a mobile phone based application to enable data 
collection and analysis to monitor and manage the business performance of the franchisees 
and the network as a whole. Third, in August 2012, the SDVC team converted all the initial 
fifteen shops into a branded network of Krishi Utsho Microfranchise in Bangladesh. 
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Fourth, in September 2012, Krishi Utsho made its first sale of about 500 kg worth of 
branded dairy cow feed to the franchisees. Fifth, nine months after the conversion of the 
shops into a branded franchise network, the fifteen franchisees showed on average a 50 
percent increase in sales revenue. All the franchisees were able to break-even within twelve 
months of their conversion.  
The key network design, network orchestration, network performance and network 
imprinting characteristics of this second episode are summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Innovation Networking during the Development and Launch Stage 
Network 
Design 
Network Orchestration Network Performance Network 
Imprinting 
Network membership: 
 Development of criteria 
and value proposition 
for the selection of 
initial shops and 
suppliers 
 Categorization of shops 
in categories A, B and 
C 
 Fifteen shops selected 
and converted into the 
microfranchise network 
in August 2012 
 Three medicine 
companies and one 
feed company selected 
as suppliers to the 
network 
Network structure 
 Krishi Utsho adopted a 
flexible conversion 
franchise model  
 Informal relation 
between the hub and 
the franchisees 
Network Position: 
 Increased trust between 
BOP farmers, milk 
collection points and 
the network because of 
the three-way payment 
system introduced 
 
Managing knowledge 
mobility: 
 Training and 
coaching of 
franchisees  
 Organization of a 
weekly animal health 
fair event to educate 
BOP and promote the 
network  
  Knowledge 
distributed by 
leveraging the 
expertise of medicine 
and feed companies 
as well as public 
sector veterinarians 
Managing innovation 
appropriability:  
 Introduction of a 
three-way credit 
facility for customers 
which co-created 
value for BOP 
farmers, the network 
and the dairy industry 
Managing network 
stability:  
 Managing early stage 
challenges to 
maintain network 
stability (working 
capital, low quality 
product from 
competition and 
political unrest) 
 First warehouse set 
up with some 
challenges 
 Krishi Utsho was 
publically promoted in 
January 2013 at the 
“Agro Technology 
Fair” 
 Converted the first 
fifteen fully branded 
franchisees in August 
2012 
 First sale of feed to 
the franchisees in 
September 2012 
 Krishi Utsho 
developed an IT-based 
performance 
management system 
 Franchisees increased 
on average their sale 
by 50 percent within 
nine months of joining 
the network 
 Franchisees reached 
break-even point 
within twelve months 
of joining the network 
Alternate network: 
 Krishi Utsho 
leveraged the 
positive and strong 
tie that existed 
between the 
franchisees and 
suppliers to ensure a 
smooth supply chain 
 Krishi Utsho 
positively leveraged 
the informal 
association of the 
LHWs to convey its 
value proposition and 
recruit them to the 
network 
Network persistence: 
 Krishi Utsho 
struggled to change 
the bad franchisee 
habit of carrying and 
selling low quality 
products 
 Krishi Utsho 
struggled to 
introduce 
professional business 
management 
practices to the 
franchisees 
 Krishi Utsho 
struggled to meet the 
high standard 
CARE’s policy 
regarding warehouse 
compliance. 
 
 
VI.3 2013-2014: Growth and Reconfiguration   
The strong performance demonstrated by the network gave the SDVC team 
confidence to press towards growing the network. The performance of the franchisees was 
particularly important to demonstrate proof of concept. The fifteen franchisees contributed 
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to spreading the news about Krishi Utsho and how it transformed the way they do business. 
This led to a high demand for becoming engaged among other agro-input shop owners in 
rural and peri-urban Northern Bangladesh. To capture the increasing demand and to 
continue to orchestrate the network, the team made some important decisions and took 
specific actions.  
VI.3.1 Formalizing the management of Krishi Utsho:  
The recruitment of an experienced Managing Director and the appointment of a 
dedicated team to focus only on growing and expanding Krishi Utsho were part of the 
SDVC team’s strategic decision. The Managing Director, recruited in May 2014 after a 
long search and some adjustment to CARE HR policy, came from a leading 
telecommunication company in Bangladesh with 11 years of professional and management 
experience in supply chain, marketing and finance. He holds an MBA degree from a 
reputable university in Bangladesh. The dedicated team of eight was assigned these core 
functions: operations management; sales and distributions; business development; 
administration and finance management; information system; and, performance 
management. Enrolling this level of human resources into the hub to support the growth 
and the reconfiguration of the network was enabled by another grant received from the 
small Family Foundation out of Atlanta in 2014 and the second phase of funding received 
by the SDVC project from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  
The Manager of the SDVC project had to bargain hard with the Human Resource 
(HR) Department and the leadership of CARE Bangladesh to be able to recruit the new 
Managing Director at a competitive salary which was outside of CARE’s salary scale but 
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comparable with the private sector market. This was an important persisting imprinting 
that the SDVC team had to deal with. The small Family Foundation out of Atlanta as well 
as the CARE USA team supported the case made by the SDVC team and convinced the 
CARE Bangladesh leadership to make the exception in the salary scale in order to bring 
the new Krishi Utsho Manager on board. Changing the job titles of the Krishi Utsho staff 
to give them a more commercial connotation contrary to development titles they carried 
was and remains a negotiation the hub is conducting with the CARE Bangladesh HR 
Department.   
VI.3.2 Recruiting additional members to the network:   
The new leadership of Krishi Utsho and the dedicated team added new franchisees 
and suppliers to the network. They also expanded the customer base and added new 
features and products to the network. Before adding new candidate franchisees though, the 
new Krishi Utsho leadership reflected on the success and challenges from the Development 
and Launch stage and made some changes to enable the network to expand on a stronger 
footing. One such change was the revision of the criteria for the selection of the candidate 
franchisees. The criteria were refined based on the experience gained and the lessons learnt 
from the first batch of franchisees who were converted into the network between 2012 and 
2013. In the word of the Deputy Manager of the network, “in the first phase we did not 
find many interesting shops given our narrow geographical focus and lack of experience. 
We had to choose from the sample available to us, but the sample was with lower 
capability. In that sense we got only few business men. In the second phase, we reviewed 
our criteria and expanded the geographies to identify good potential shops, this helped 
very much…. The sample was very good as a result.” As testified by a franchisee that was 
  
 
53 
converted into the network in this phase, Krishi Utsho used the following criteria to select 
him: “Honesty, sincerity, honorability and popularity in the community, ability to adjust to 
Krishi Utsho’s business policy, ability to help the people, especially illiterate people and 
shop geographically well positioned in the market place.” The Deputy Manager of the 
network who is also in charge of the operation and the expansion of the network added: 
“We consider personal trait and character, business transaction record with suppliers, 
cash position, credit worthiness, customer base and relation, supplier relation, investment 
capacity, specific experience in the business, background and education, linkage with 
different association, interest to work with Krishi Utsho and positive references from 
others.”  
These criteria were validated in Krishi Utsho’s documents. Table 8 summarizes 
how the criteria evolved between the Development and Launch stage and the Growth and 
Reconfiguration stage. Personal character, strategic position of the shops in the market 
place, track record with suppliers, and the financial capability for additional investment 
were some of the criteria added to select the second batch of franchisees. By the end of 
2014, Krishi Utsho counted forty eight franchisees in conversion and fifteen franchisees 
fully branded.  
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Table 8: Evolution of selection criteria for franchisee 
Criteria for franchisees’ selection – Development 
and Launch stage 
(2012-2013) 
Criteria for franchisees’ selection – Growth and 
Reconfiguration stage (2013-2014) 
1. Have an existing outlet in the targeted 
geographical location  
2. Be a trained livestock health worker 
3. Carry feed and medicine in demand by the 
targeted BOP farmers  
4. Shop located in an easy proximity to BOP 
farmers participating in the SDVC project 
5. Interest in joining the microfranchise 
network and being compliant of its rules. 
1. Be honest, sincere, honorable and 
maintain a good reputation in the 
community  
2. Shop strategically well positioned in the 
market place 
3. Have a positive business track record with 
suppliers 
4. Be credit worthy and have financial 
resources to invest to expand the business  
5. Have a strong customer base and positive 
customer relation  
6. Have an experience in conducting agro-
input supply business  
7. Interested to join the Krishi Utsho 
network and to serve BOP farmers  
8. Receive positive references from others 
As for the suppliers, Krishi Utsho did not make any drastic change to the criteria or 
the process used in the Development and Launch stage. It, however, added three additional 
reputable medicine firms which brought the total number of medicine firms in the network 
to six. One firm is a multinational company with headquarters outside Bangladesh and the 
other five are Bangladeshi Headquartered, but with operations in several countries in Asia 
and Africa. Together the six companies control over 80% of the animal health market in 
Bangladesh. Krishi Utsho also added a couple of feed firms as suppliers. In total, by the 
end of 2014, Krishi Utsho had nine suppliers as part of its network (See Appendix 1 for 
details).  
VI.3.3 Addressing supply chain issues:  
An important change introduced by the network was outsourcing the supply chain 
management. Given the growth of the network and the challenge the network was up 
against in complying with the high standard and restrictive policy of CARE’s internal 
warehouse and the cost associated with it, Krishi Utsho recruited a third party firm to 
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manage the supply chain on behalf of the network. The thinking of the leadership team was 
that a third party provider would not need to comply with CARE’s internal policy and could 
manage the supply chain more cost-effectively than having it in house. This was reflected 
in the words of the Managing Director of OSS, the third party firm recruited: “The major 
challenge for Krishi Utsho is that CARE’s policy is very restrictive. It slows down the 
expansion of the business. OSS can help since it does not have this policy issue to support 
the whole network.” Another rationale was that the team did not have requisite expertise 
yet and that it was important to start on solid ground to support the learning that comes 
with supply chain management. The third party company was recruited in early 2014 after 
a competitive bid and was given the mandate to set up warehouses at strategic locations 
and manage the procurement and distribution of the inventories from the selected suppliers 
to the franchisees. In the words of the Managing Director of the third party firm, “OSS is a 
supporting partner of Krishi Utsho. We help with warehousing, stocking, procurement, 
distribution, payment, in brief supply chain management.” As of the end of December 
2014, OSS was serving 56 fully branded and in conversion franchisees with 4 warehouses 
and a team of service personnel in each warehouse. OSS became an important player in the 
network helping to ensure a smooth inventory management and supply chain of the 
network. OSS also contributed to inject new ideas and innovation into the network given 
its technological background as a firm. One such influence was the promotion of a mobile 
phone based application to ensure timely inventory management.  
VI.3.4 Managing innovation appropriability:  
An important innovation introduced and promoted by the network was a product 
known to some dairy farmers but not commercialized in Bangladesh. In the quest for 
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satisfying BOP farmers who complain about low fat content of their milk, which is one of 
the important factors in determining milk price in addition to volume and quality, Krishi 
Utsho was always searchingfor scalable solutions.  
 
Figure 9: Photo credit of Krishi Utsho 
 
Coconut oil cake came about as one such solution as a natural product with 8 - 12% 
oil or fat content. It is a by-product during production of virgin coconut oil which becomes 
coconut flour if pulverized or finely ground. It has more than one year of shelf life if stored 
at room temperature. In fact, some farmers and a veterinarian who did business with Krishi 
Utsho in a Northern district called Pabna were aware of the virtue of coconut oil cake in 
increasing milk fat content, but this knowledge was not widespread in Bangladesh. They 
suggested to Krishi Utsho the idea of commercializing the product to make it available to 
all dairy farmers in Bangladesh. A Krishi Utsho sale staff brought the idea to the attention 
of Krishi Utsho’s leadership in one of their monthly meeting. Krishi Utsho investigated the 
product and found that there is indeed a potential market for such product given the demand 
from BOP farmers to increase their milk fat content to fetch a better market price. Krishi 
Utsho decided to do a pilot test of the product with few dairy farmers along with a 
laboratory test. The result was positive as the fat content of the milk produced increased by 
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3.5% in average. This represented a significant improvement as the maximum fat content 
of dairy in Bangladesh is 4.6%. The detailed results of the test conducted by Krishi Utsho 
are found in Appendix 2. Krishi Utsho also conducted a study to assess the demand, which 
was projected to be close to 20 tons per month. It also assessed the supply of quality 
coconut oil cake and its cost-benefit analysis. Krishi Utsho found a leading firm who 
manufactures “Parachute” coconut oil in Bangladesh who was willing to supply top quality 
coconut oil cake to the network. Krishi Utsho further developed an additional partnership 
with a third party firm called Rosa Trade to procure, package, brand and distribute the 
product to the Krishi Utsho network through the OSS warehousing. As of end of December 
2014, 70% of the franchisees in the network sold the coconut oil cake as one of their fast 
moving products. This statement from the Director of Rosa Trade captured very well the 
excitement about the new product introduced by Krishi Utsho: “I found that the product 
helps to increase milk quality. Krishi Utsho can become symbol of quality. It will be an 
important symbol to the farmers. My projection is that after 2 years, I can carry about 
100t/month.” 
 The introduction of the coconut oil cake and the branded feed were two iconic 
products that the franchisees procured 100% from Krishi Utsho. The introduction of both 
products in the network contributed to increase the profile and the centrality of Krishi 
Utsho as hub firm. This also contributed to increase the brand trust of the network as the 
franchisees and BOP farmers were not used to these two quality products before the advent 
of Krishi Utsho. The process followed by Krishi Utsho in introducing the coconut oil cake 
and to some extent the branded feed demonstrated the openness from Krishi Utsho’s 
leadership and staff to new ideas and suggestions that could create value to the entire 
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network. This statement from the Managing Director of Krishi Utsho captured the value 
the network places on innovation: “We always welcome innovative ideas, because we have 
technical people as shop owners, livestock health worker and local agronomists on the 
ground. They always have some innovative ideas which do not always come through formal 
education but through their own experience. We always welcome those ideas. If we found 
any new idea, first of all we have to pilot those, if successful, as we are not planning to 
start our own manufacturing at this time, we can go to suppliers or manufacturers with 
that idea to make the product for us.” 
VI.3.5 Managing knowledge mobility:  
 In addition to the training, coaching and weekly animal health fair, which were 
carried over to the Growth and Reconfiguration stage to promote knowledge distribution 
and mobility in the network, Krishi Utsho instituted a quarterly meeting with all its 
franchisees (fully converted and the ones in conversion) to take stock of the progress of the 
network, conduct refresher training, and discuss any topic of interest for the franchisees. 
This created the space for the franchisees to get to know each other, to build a strong 
identity and social capital, to share experience, learning and tips among each other, to voice 
their concerns, and make recommendations and suggestions to the hub firm. As witnessed 
by one franchisee, “We discuss many different things and exchange ideas on how to carry 
and develop our business.” Furthermore, Krishi Utsho organized monthly staff meetings 
to discuss progress, set targets, and plan ahead.  
For the first time, Krishi Utsho organized an annual retreat for its staff in November 2014 
to ensure that all the staff members were clear about the vision and mission of Krishi Utsho, 
how it is different from the SDVC project, and to strategize and plan. As witnessed by the 
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Deputy Manager of the Network who was involved since the beginning of the network, 
“The retreat refreshes us to work in new manner.” These various meetings created 
opportunities for the staff to share knowledge and information among themselves. The 
franchisees also maintain an informal network among themselves and with Krishi Utsho 
sale staff who visit them on a daily basis. Krishi Utsho listened closely to the BOP farmers 
who are the ultimate customers of the network. The weekly animal health fair described 
above is one such mechanism that the network used to receive feedback from the BOP 
farmers and to disseminate knowledge and information. The network also leveraged the 
opportunity they had through the SDVC project to collect feedback from the SDVC staff 
on what the BOP farmers are saying about the network. In addition, Krishi Utsho collected 
feedback from other players such as milk collectors and chilling plant managers who 
collaborated with the SDVC project.  
VI.3.6 Managing the long term sustainability of the network:  
To ensure the stability of the network and to stay true to its vision of becoming a 
self-sustained social enterprise, Kristi Utsho introduced in this Growth and 
Reconfiguration stage a royalty fee for its franchisees. Krishi Utsho kept the annual fee 
very minimal at this early stage to allow all the franchisees to be able to pay. The fee was 
set at about $65 equivalent of local currency per year. The fee is subsidized as it did not 
reflect the full cost of the service the hub firm provided to the franchisees. Krishi Utsho 
educated the new batch of franchisees as well as the first generation on the rationale of the 
fees and set the effective date for the fee for the year 2015.  
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In addition to the royalty fee, Krishi Utsho also researched ways to get financial 
institutions in Bangladesh interested in the network to help address the working capital 
issue which concerned both franchisees and the hub firm. Many franchisees ranked the 
working capital as their concern number one at this stage of the development of the 
network. To address this issue, Krishi Utsho commissioned a number of studies on the 
subject and held negotiations with several financial institutions. Unfortunately, none of 
them were able to come up with a suitable solution. One key issue was the high interest 
rate, up to 20% per year with tangible collateral, charged by banks and microfinance 
institutions in Bangladesh. As a temporary solution, Krishi Utsho continued to negotiate 
supplier credit with its supplier firms to allow the franchisees to have between 30 to 60 
days to pay back their inventories. But not all suppliers were amenable to this type of 
supplier credit. Krishi Utsho even had to deal with resistance from some supplier 
representatives who would prefer to control the terms of the partnerships with Krishi Utsho 
at the regional level instead of having Krishi Utsho operate at the national level because of 
their bonus system. In fact, the sale executives from the supplier firms were incentivized 
to deal directly with the franchisees instead of selling in bulk to Krishi Utsho.  
VI.3.7 Managing the stability of the network:  
An important challenge that surfaced during this stage was motivating women to 
become franchisees and to stay in the network. This challenge was mostly due to social 
and cultural norms in Bangladesh because of the traditional role assigned to women as 
housewives and caretakers of the household. This limits women mobility in their 
communities. As a result, very few women are engaged in business and in the market place. 
Few also have the financial means to invest in such business. Their workloads as wives are 
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other constraints women faced, especially if their partners are not in agreement with them 
to engage in economic activities outside of the homestead. Krishi Utsho ended up spending 
a lot of time with interested women, intermediating with their families and providing one 
on one coaching. The success rate for women franchisees has, however, been very limited 
so far with only two female franchisees among the over forty five franchisees in the 
network as of December 2014.  
Getting BOP farmers to demand and buy quality products also remained a challenge that 
the network continued to deal with at this stage. This issue was exacerbated by the 
reduction in milk price which prevented farmers from buying quality input given their low 
purchasing power. Further, the counterfeited products that the competitions continued to 
sell with a high resemblance to genuine products did not help farmers to make informed 
buying decision. All these factors constituted a serious threat to the stability of the network. 
To address these challenges, Krishi Utsho continued to work with its suppliers, the 
government and the franchisees as well as to collaborate with the SDVC Project to increase 
the absorptive capacity of the BOP farmers and advocate for quality standards in the agro-
input business.  
VI.3.8 Network performance:  
Despite all the challenges, Krishi Utsho displayed strong performance during this 
stage of its development. The strong results came once again from the franchisees that were 
able to increase their sale by 85% on average compared to the previous year. The number 
of BOP farmers served by the network increased by 56% to over 17,000. Moreover, the 
hub firm as franchisor was also able to double the commission it derived from its 
intermediation to help finance its operational cost. It is important to note, however, that the 
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network remained highly subsidized by philanthropic money. The volume of products sold 
by the hub firm also increased drastically. For instance, for the feed which the hub firm 
introduced in September 2012 with about 500 Kg sold, as of end of the year 2014, the hub 
firm was able to sell 400,000 Kg worth of branded feed. The hub firm also successfully 
introduced the coconut oil cake as a new branded product in late 2014 with a promising 
high demand from BOP farmers. The number of total franchisees grew to forty eight, out 
of which fifteen were fully branded in the previous Development and Launch stage; the 
number of suppliers to the network grew from four in the previous stage to nine in this 
stage; and, the staffing of the hub also grew from eight to ten fulltime dedicated staff 
serving the growing network. The hub firm was also successful in reducing the financial 
dependency of the franchisees for their branding.  
The key network design, network orchestration, network performance and network 
imprinting characteristics of this Growth and Reconfiguration stage are summarized in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Innovation Networking during the Growth and Reconfiguration Stage 
Network 
Design 
Network Orchestration Network Performance Network 
Imprinting 
Network membership: 
 Revision of 
franchisees’ selection 
criteria based on 
lessons from the 
previous stage  
 Three additional 
medicine companies 
and two feed 
companies added to the 
network  
 Introduction of royalty 
fee for new batch of 
franchisees 
Network position:  
 Network centrality 
increased due to the 
successful introduction 
of the coconut oil cake 
and the branded feed 
 
Managing knowledge 
mobility: 
 Training and 
coaching of new 
franchisees  
 Quarterly meeting 
between franchisees 
and hub firm to 
discuss progress and 
share knowledge 
 Informal feedback 
between franchisees 
and hub firm staff  
Managing innovation 
appropriability:  
 Introduction coconut 
oil cake to address the 
low milk fat content 
issue for BOP 
farmers 
Managing network 
stability:  
 Outsourcing of the 
supply chain 
management to 
address CARE’s 
restrictive policy  
 Recruitment of a 
Managing Director 
and appointment of a 
dedicated Krishi 
Utsho team 
 Failed negotiation of 
affordable working 
capital with financial 
institutions 
 Maintaining female 
franchisees in the 
network was a 
challenge given social 
norms  
 The franchisees 
increased their sale by 
85% on average 
 The hub firm doubled 
its commission as 
contribution to its 
operational cost 
 The network increased 
its reach by 56% to a 
total of 17,000 BOP 
farmers 
 Krishi Utsho added an 
additional 33 in 
conversion 
franchisees, bringing 
the total number to 48 
 5 new firms joined the 
network as suppliers 
and sub-contractors 
 
Network persistence: 
 Krishi Utsho 
continued to struggle 
changing the negative 
habit of franchisees 
carrying and selling 
low quality products 
 Krishi Utsho 
continued to struggle 
introducing a 
professional business 
management 
practices to 
franchisees 
 CARE HR was not 
initially flexible to 
accommodate the 
salary of the Hub 
Manager 
 
 
VI.4 2015 and onward: Consolidation and Expansion   
The first quarter of 2015 was a challenging start of the year that threatened the 
stability of the Krishi Utsho network with a political turmoil between the two main political 
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parties in Bangladesh with nationwide protests and traffic blockades and many violent and 
fatal attacks on the public. The country and its economy were paralyzed for the most part 
of the first quarter of the year. According to one leading source of news, the Dhaka Tribune 
(www.dhakatribune.com), the World Bank estimated that the political unrest cost the 
country up to $2.20 billion. Many lives were also lost. Krishi Utsho’s business was 
impacted as it was the case in 2013 due to the road blockade and the difficulties of moving 
goods around. “This was horrible for us. Farmers could not sell their production, they 
could not buy input. It was a huge loss, especially for perishable products such as dairy,” 
said the Deputy Manager of the network. However, based on lessons learnt from the similar 
situation in 2013, the Krishi Utsho team managed to maintain minimum operations, 
moving goods to franchisees from willing suppliers during night times and over the 
weekend when situations allowed. Krishi Utsho also leveraged the technology capabilities 
of its third party supply chain management firm to introduce an IT enabled mobile phone 
payment system. Further, Krishi Utsho innovated by organizing franchisees into group to 
promote their products at a single point in the community where BOP farmers could easily 
gather and where franchisees could carry their products to allow BOP farmers to make their 
purchase. These innovative actions taken by the hub firm contributed to increase its 
centrality and the trust from franchisees and BOP farmers as a credible network designer 
and orchestrator who committed to stay true to its mission and vision despite adverse and 
difficult situations.  
VI.4.1 Developing a new business plan for the network: 
Although paralyzed by the political unrest during the first quarter of 2015, Krishi 
Utsho used the slowdown of the business to consolidate its learning and achievements 
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through development of a business plan for continued expansion of the network to create 
value for all the stakeholders involved. The three year experience through the previous 
stages of the network and the “learning by doing” approach used by Krishi Utsho helped 
to refine its understanding of the network and to confidently make realistic assumptions 
and financial projections about the future of the network. To develop the business plan, 
Krishi Utsho conducted a number of studies including a market assessment and detailed 
discussions with franchisees, suppliers, competitions and other key stakeholders of the 
network. The business plan process allowed the network to clarify and re-affirm its 
mission, vision and value proposition. Its mission statement found in its business plan reads 
as follows: “our mission is to be the preferred shopping destination for agro input products 
and services for all smallholder farmers in Bangladesh. We will uphold this mission by 
selling quality agro inputs in the market and providing excellent service to customers. We 
will be a leader in the agro input industry by serving marginalized populations in rural 
Bangladesh. Krishi Utsho’s aim is to increase the yield and quality of farmer livestock 
outputs and ultimately improve the economic livelihoods of rural farming households. 
Krishi Utsho will advocate for women empowerment by selecting women franchisees to 
join the network.” Our interview with the franchisees and Krishi Utsho’s staff demonstrated 
a high level of understanding of this mission. The business plan also afforded the 
opportunity to clarify the path of the network to become an independent spin-off social 
enterprise under CARE Enterprise Inc. Further, it made assumptions about its financial 
viability with a break even anticipated in the fiscal year 2019. As a result, Krishi Utsho 
projects to have 270 franchisees in the network by 2022, to expand geographically and start 
offering a range of additional product such as poultry, horticulture and fishery. Ultimately, 
  
 
66 
the business plan constituted a road map for the network. In addition, it allowed the hub 
firm to estimate the resources it needed to achieve its ambitious goals and it represented an 
important negotiation, marketing and fundraising tool for the network.  
VI.4.2 Understanding the impact on BOP farmers: 
The Consolidation and Expansion stage was also marked by a detailed assessment Krishi 
Utsho conducted to understand the social and economic impact of the network on BOP 
farmers as part of its customer base. The impact assessment was designed and implemented 
in house and covered 400 BOP farmers in various geographies in Northern Bangladesh, 
namely Bogra, Sirajganj, Ranpur and Pabna. The survey was designed to compare the 
before and after impact on a range of socio-economic indicators. The major indicators on 
which data were collected included among others cost of input, time savings, income of 
the BOP household, food security and women empowerment status. Overall the result was 
very positive with marked impact on cost and time savings for BOP farmers. On average, 
the introduction and orchestration of the network decreased the time and cost spent by BOP 
farmers to access agro-input, notably, feed, medicine and vitamins by 50%. The frequency 
of visit to franchisees by BOP farmers increased from 2.8 to 3.7 times per week as a result 
of the closer proximity. The survey also revealed a 31% increase in the household income 
of the BOP farmers, from an average of an equivalent of $175 per month to $230. The food 
security status of the BOP farmers assessed through their expenditure on food items such 
as wheat, rice, fish, meat and vegetable increased between 10 and 15%. The empowerment 
status of women, specifically as related to women’s influence on household decision 
making over economic matters increased steadily from 45% before to 85% after the 
introduction of Krishi Utsho (the SDVC project also contributed significantly to these last 
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two indicators as Krishi Utsho was operating in the same geographies). These positive 
impacts demonstrate how effective the network is in co-creating tangible value for BOP 
farmers in Bangladesh. Appendix 3 has further impact data from the survey conducted by 
the Krishi Utsho team 
 
Figure 10: Household Income before and after Krishi Utsho  
 
Table 10: Availability of inputs before and after Krishi Utsho  
 
  
 
68 
VI.4.3 Recruiting new members to the network: 
Staying true to the roadmap developed early in the year, Krishi Utsho continued to 
recruit new candidate franchisees to expand the network. This time, Krishi Utsho also 
started to expand the network in the southern part of the country. To go south, Krishi Utsho 
partnered with a consortium of organizations under the leadership of a local renowned 
development organization called DAM. CARE is also part of the consortium that is 
implementing an agriculture development project with funding from the US Government. 
The aim of the agriculture project is aligned with the mission pursued by Krishi Utsho 
which is to offer BOP farmers a timely access to a range of quality and affordable 
agriculture input and services to boost agriculture productivity, achieve food and nutrition 
security and reduce poverty. This partnership offered a “win-win” opportunity for Krishi 
Utsho to extend its network to the Southern part of the country and to start a small pilot 
with five candidate franchisees selected to go through the recruitment process described in 
Figure 6. As a niche product for the South, Krishi Utsho selected animal feeding 
concentrate given the prominence of livestock fattening and commercialization in that part 
of the country. Krishi Utsho is also in discussion with a number of companies who may be 
interested in joining the network in the south. The negotiation was in its early days by the 
time we concluded our data collection. At the same time, Krishi Utsho continued to recruit 
other candidate franchisees in the northern region of the country where it has its foundation. 
The informal LHW association facilitated by the SDVC project continued to be a good 
platform for information sharing and for identifying potential franchisees. As of the end of 
December 2015, Krishi Utsho had 112 branded and in-conversion franchisees in the 
network. This number includes fifteen additional fully branded franchisees that Krishi 
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Utsho inaugurated in June 2015. The inauguration was an opportunity to invite the 
surrounding community members as well as the Head of the Livestock Department from 
the District Government Offices to promote the network. This made the total number of 
branded franchisees to twenty-eight because two branded franchisees in the earlier stage 
dropped out from the network. The main reasons for the attrition were that the two 
franchisees were no longer able to meet the standard set up by the hub firm and went out 
of business. Eighteen other candidate franchisees are identified to be branded in early 2016.  
VI.4.4 Introducing new line of products: 
On the products and services front, Krishi Utsho conducted a market demand assessment 
to understand other products BOP farmers are interested in and could buy. Based on the 
assessment and several feedbacks received from the franchisees themselves, Krishi Utsho 
decided to introduce aquaculture products into the network. Hence, Krishi Utsho selected 
four different products for further laboratory and field tests. Three suppliers of aquaculture 
and Tamim Agro, an existing supplier firm in the network, are the manufacturers of the 
products under testing. The results of the test are still pending. Poultry products are next in 
line, but Krishi Utsho prefers taking a stepwise approach in introducing new products in 
the network to minimize risks.  
VI.4.5 Continuous improvement of the supply chain:  
Reducing waste and making the network efficient continued to be the focus of Krishi 
Utsho in this stage. In addition, having a better handle on the supply chain management 
instead of relying heavily on a third party firm was a continuous concern for Krishi Utsho 
given how vital this aspect is for the stability of network. To that effect, Krishi Utsho held 
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several brainstorming and discussion meetings with OSS, the third party supply chain 
manager, the franchisees, and the supplier firm members of the network. As a result, 
Krishi Utsho finally made the decision to do away with expensive warehouses and to 
experiment with a stack point model. The stack points are designed to be strategically 
located in close proximity of a cluster of franchisees in order to minimize logistics cost 
and increase speed in moving inventories. Stack points are smaller version of warehouses, 
are easier to manage, and have a much lower operation cost. As of December 2015, five 
stack points are established with only one warehouse maintained. The three other 
warehouses were closed. Krishi Utsho also negotiated with the suppliers to deliver smaller 
quantities directly to the stack points. The Feed firm Tamim Agro was particularly 
supportive of the new modality and is working with Krishi Utsho to promote the new stack 
point model. OSS still played a role in the supply chain management, but this time its role 
was reconfigured and somewhat reduced. OSS now handles the transactions with the 
suppliers and maintains the inventory of the stack points. OSS also continued to handle 
all the banking transactions associated with the new modality as well as the leasing of the 
stack points given the fact that Krishi Utsho is still a project within CARE and do not yet 
have the legal status to operate its own bank account and other administrative tasks given 
CARE’s onerous compliance standards. However, Krishi Utsho decided to play a larger 
role and is now in charge of products delivery to the franchisees’ outlets and payment 
collection through its sales executives. This new modality has proven quite effective with 
an expected reduction of 40% of the supply chain cost. Krishi Utsho also continued to 
leverage the IT capability of OSS for the supply chain management of the network.  
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VI.4.6 Organizing the first closing event:  
A significant activity organized by Krishi Utsho in June 2015 was a “closing event” to 
mark the end of its fiscal year. This was the first time Krishi Utsho organized such an 
event as an opportunity to recognize, motivate and reward best performing franchisees in 
the network. Krishi Utsho also used the same opportunity to dialogue with the franchisees 
about the vision of the network, the plan for the new fiscal year, the quality standards and 
its expansion plan and to promote learning amongst the franchisees. The event also 
afforded the opportunity to the hub firm to collect any remaining payment from the 
franchisees. The event was organized in each of the four districts currently covered by the 
network in the northern part of the country, which are Bogra, Sirajganj, Rangpur and 
Pabna. The hub firm rewarded two categories of performance. In total eight franchisees 
were selected and rewarded, four in the category of bestseller with the highest revenue 
and customer service and the other four in the category of best franchisees with the highest 
financial transactions and payment record with the hub firm. The closing event was very 
successful and generated a high level of enthusiasm and awareness amongst the 
franchisees. It also contributed to increase the position of the hub firm in relation to the 
franchisees. The Managing Director of the network was very pleased with the outcome 
and promised to repeat it every year and to open it to other stakeholders of the network, 
specifically the supplier firms.  
VI.4.7 Securing additional funding for the network: 
The new business plan developed by the network helped crystalize the financial 
resources the network needed to expand and for Krishi Utsho as a hub firm and franchisor 
to reach breakeven and spin off as an independent social enterprise. To mobilize the 
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financial resources, Krishi Utsho prioritized receiving additional grants to build up its 
equity base before mobilizing external commercial funding such as equity and debt. In that 
regard, Krishi Utsho developed and submitted a number of proposals to various 
philanthropic organizations. One lead donor that Krishi Utsho pursued aggressively in this 
stage was the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherland in Bangladesh who is interested in 
the agriculture sector development for BOP farmers to achieve food and nutrition security 
and end poverty. Hence, Krishi Utsho visited with the Embassy on many occasions to 
present the network and its new business plan. As a result of the sustained cultivation effort, 
Krishi Utsho was invited by the Embassy to submit a proposal for grant funding in May 
2015. After several months of review and negotiations, Krishi Utsho finally got an official 
letter from the Embassy on October 17, 2015 notifying the approval by the Ambassador of 
a grant of $1.3 million to the network. This was exciting news for Krishi Utsho and CARE 
as this new grant, the largest in Krishi Utsho’s history, was exactly what the network 
needed to expand and execute its newly developed business plan. In the words of the 
Manager of the Network, “this new grant will help us execute our business plan and 
become a fully fledge social enterprise. We are very grateful to the Embassy of 
Netherland.” 
VI.4.8 Network performance: 
This last stage in the life of the Krishi Utsho has proven another success with a strong 
network performance. The new financial resource mobilized from the Embassy of 
Netherland in Bangladesh gave a strong momentum to the Krishi Utsho team to gain the 
confidence to continue to design and orchestrate the network to co-create value for all 
involved.  
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Figure 11: Customer coverage per month 
The strong positive result from the impact assessment was another key ingredient 
to demonstrate how value is being created and captured by BOP farmers who are the 
ultimate target of the network. As in the previous stages, the franchisees continued to 
demonstrate a strong financial performance. For this stage, the franchisees increased their 
annual sale by 34%. The hub firm also increased its commission by 2.1 times allowing it 
to cover part of its operation costs. Over 20,000 customers were served by end of December 
2015, which is an increase of 17% compared to the previous stage. The network also 
realized significant cost reduction in its supply chain management of up to 40%. Forty six 
candidate franchisees were added to the network bringing the total number to hundred and 
ten, out of which twenty eight were fully branded. Two franchisees unfortunately dropped 
out in this stage, bringing the total number of drop out to four. The main reason for the 
drop out is franchisee behavior contrary to network standards. One was involved in politics 
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and abandoned the management of the shop while the second one was involved in 
gambling, using the financial resources of its business.  
 
Figure 12: Franchisor Sales and Income in 2015 
VI.4.9 Managing the network stability and sustainability: 
 Despite the successful year 2015, Krishi Utsho continued to face important 
challenges which threaten the stability of the network and its ability to create sustained 
innovation outcome for its stakeholders. The network negative imprinting described above, 
such as the poor adherence to quality and management standards by the franchisees and 
their lack of adequate working capital, are specific examples. The continued competition 
in the market, especially from low quality medicines firms dumping the market and luring 
franchisees with cheap quality product reinforced this behavior. The hub firm was spending 
the bulk of its time to address these challenges through continuous refresher training, 
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coaching and knowledge exchange among suppliers and franchisees. The hub firm also 
used the opportunity of the organization of some franchisees in informal network such as 
the LHW association to identify champion franchisees to exert peer pressure on other 
lagging franchisees and to continuously communicate about the standards of the network. 
Demand creation for quality products and services amongst BOP farmers was another 
challenge the hub firm and the members of the network addressed through the weekly 
animal health fair and other customer education such as marketing campaigns.  
 Another important challenge was the lack of understanding of the mission and the 
end goal of Krishi Utsho by the majority of the suppliers. This confusion came from the 
fact that Krishi Utsho did not yet have a high brand visibility with many of the suppliers, 
and the later still associated the network with a typical time-bound development project of 
CARE. Many sales managers and representatives interviewed at the regional level cannot 
articulate Krishi Utsho’s mission, vision, and its long-term plan to become an independent 
financially viable and impactful social enterprise contrary to the franchisees. With the 
exception of the feed firms, the medicine firms have a well-developed distribution network 
in Bangladesh and they did not yet comprehend the full value proposition of Krishi Utsho. 
They are also part of a number of professional associations in the country such as the 
Animal Health Association and the World Poultry Science Association at the national and 
regional levels. As a result, although they do business with the network, their sense of 
belonging to the Krishi Utsho network is not as strong as the franchisees. Hence, they treat 
Krishi Utsho as any other wholesale buyer. This also affects the financial negotiation 
between Krishi Utsho and the medicine companies and some of the resistance we described 
above. The weak rule of law in Bangladesh and the fact that there was no contract signed 
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between Krishi Utsho as franchisor and the franchisees are other challenges that could 
affect the stability of the network. In the word of a senior staff of the network, “one threat 
that I see is if the franchisees become well organized in their association, they can link up 
directly with the companies we work with today. This could create a direct conflict. ” This 
has not manifested yet, but a risk worth pointing out.  
The key network design, network orchestration, network performance and network 
imprinting characteristics of this fourth episode are summarized in Table 10. 
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Table 11: Innovation Networking during the Consolidation and Expansion Stage 
Network 
Design 
Network Orchestration Network Performance Network 
Imprinting 
Network membership: 
 Additional 44 
candidate franchisees 
added to the network 
 15 branded franchisees 
inaugurated in June 
2015 
 2 franchisees dropped 
out due to miss-
management 
 Partnership forged with 
a consortium of 
organizations to 
expand in the South  
 Ongoing discussion 
with 4 manufacturers 
to add aquaculture 
products 
Network structure 
 Governance of the 
network still informal 
as franchisee contracts 
are not signed 
Network position 
 High level of 
understanding of 
Krishi Utsho’s mission 
and vision by 
franchisees 
 Hub firm centrality 
increased due to 
innovative actions 
taken during political 
unrest  
 Impact study on BOP 
farmers reinforced the 
centrality of the hub 
firm as value creator 
 Medicine firms 
continue to hold 
dominant position in 
the network 
 
Managing knowledge 
mobility: 
 Development of the 
first business plan for 
the network 
 Successful 
organization of the 
first closing event 
with reward for best 
performing 
franchisees 
 Training and 
coaching of new 
franchisees  
 Quarterly meeting 
between franchisees 
and hub firm to 
discuss progress and 
share knowledge 
 Informal feedback 
between franchisees 
and hub firm staff  
Managing innovation 
appropriability:  
 Introduction of a 
stack point model in 
lieu of expensive 
warehouses to 
manage supply chain 
with 40% cost 
reduction  
Managing network 
stability:  
 Political unrest 
resulting in loss of 
business the first 
quarter of 2015 
 Moving goods at 
night time and 
weekend and 
organizing collective 
community selling  
 The franchisees 
increased sale by 34% 
on average 
 The hub firm multiply 
its commission by 2.1 
to contribute to its 
operational cost 
 The network increased 
its reach by 17% to a 
total of  20,000 BOP 
farmers 
 Reduction of 
operation cost of the 
supply chain 
management by 40% 
 Impressive impact on 
BOP farmers 
demonstrating how the 
network is co-creating 
value for its primary 
stakeholders 
 
Network persistence: 
 Krishi Utsho 
continued to struggle 
to change the bad 
habit of the 
franchisees in 
carrying and selling 
low quality products 
 Krishi Utsho 
continue to struggle 
to introduce 
professional business 
management 
practices to 
franchisees 
 Krishi Utsho 
leveraged the 
informal association 
of the franchisees to 
exert peer pressure 
and communicate 
quality standards 
 Supplier firms 
organized in other 
network and have a 
lower sense of 
belonging to Krishi 
Utsho  
 CARE overshadowed 
Krishi Utsho as an 
aspiring independent 
social enterprise.  
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VII DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Drawing upon Orchestration of Innovation Network (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006) and 
Network Imprinting (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) as theoretical framework and based on a 
longitudinal case study that covered over five years of rich data, this research has explored 
how CARE designed and orchestrated a microfranchise network to facilitate the provision 
of timely access to quality and affordable agriculture input and services to BOP farmers in 
Bangladesh. We have demonstrated how the microfranchise network evolved over time 
through four stages and how the design and orchestration played out. We have also 
highlighted the imprinting of each network member and other key stakeholders and how 
these path dependencies altered the way the network was designed and orchestrated to 
achieve outcomes. In the following, we articulate and discuss the consequential 
contributions to theory and practice.  
VII.1 Contributions to Theory  
Microfranchising is increasingly gaining in popularity as an effective business 
model in the BOP context. The microfranchise literature has, however, dealt mostly with 
the potential benefits of microfranchising (Fairbourne, 2007; Gibson, 2007; Magleby, 
2007). Economic growth and efficiency as means of achieving poverty alleviation goals 
(Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011) have been studied extensively in the literature. 
The reduced risk from buying into a “proven business system” (Fairbourne, 2007), and the 
benefits of belonging to part of a “democratic network” (Magleby, 2007, p. 46) are other 
issues highlighted in the literature. Kistruck et al. (2011) also conducted studies contrasting 
the traditional franchising system to microfranchising in the BOP context looking at three 
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key performance drivers that research suggests are associated with franchising: 
overcoming agency concerns, reducing resource scarcity, and leveraging brands and 
standardizing operations.  
The literature is, however, silent on how microfranchise models emerge and 
materialize through design and orchestration of innovation networks aimed at co-creating 
value with BOP entrepreneurs. Furthermore, such microfranchise-based innovation 
networks engage BOP entrepreneurs and firms with past and current ties and practices into 
a new network. Rather than dealing with this important issue separately, BOP theory could 
benefit from bringing together the imprinting and the orchestration of innovation network 
perspectives into an integrated theoretical and practical understanding. Hence, based on 
our empirical findings and extant literature, we suggest a number of propositions that the 
BOP, microfranchise and innovation network literatures may use to improve the processes 
by which microfranchise-based innovation networks are designed and orchestrated to 
realize the win-win potential in emergent BOP markets. Following, we develop two 
propositions to contribute to the BOP and microfranchise literature and an integrated 
framework to contribute to the network innovation literature in general.  
The importance of decentralization and management of innovation and knowledge in 
microfranchise network:   
Traditional franchising typically involves a tight coupling of franchisees that 
subscribe to a certain business format and are committed to follow strict guidelines and 
standards. Creating a unified network with rather clear identity, it is a recipe for scaling up 
a proven business model to create economic growth and meet customers’ expectations. 
However, the achieved degree of unity and standardization may cause problems, since it 
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suppresses variety and, thus, innovation (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). In these traditional 
arrangements, continuous innovation and knowledge are driven from the top (the 
franchisor) with little room for the franchisees to contribute knowledge and innovate 
themselves. A study conducted on McDonald’s network in Germany found that due to the 
sustained and tight strategic leadership of the network by the headquarters and its regional 
representatives, the identity of the McDonald’s network seems to interpenetrate the 
identities of the franchisees and their outlets to an extent that leaves the outlets with 
requisite identity adoption rather than opportunities for identity creation (Rometsch & 
Sydow, 2003).  
In contrast, we argue that the studied microfranchise network, which emerged on 
the premise of achieving social goal at scale while creating a scalable platform for small 
and independent entrepreneurs to expand their business, had room to co-create innovation 
and knowledge to achieve intended results. This is particularly important given the difficult 
social issue many microfranchise networks aim to solve within a fragmented and weak 
institutional context (Kistruck, 2011). As such, associating the BOP population themselves 
and using the knowledge and creativity of small and micro entrepreneurs in the BOP 
market and all the other actors involved have considerable potential for knowledge and 
innovation co-creation to achieve success (Simanis & Hart, 2008). We therefore posit that 
microfranchise networks operating in difficult environment and with their main goal of 
creating social value would more benefit from decentralizing and adapting knowledge and 
innovation in contrast with traditional franchise networks operating in stable and developed 
environment and with the main motive of maximizing shareholder values.   
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The burgeoning microfranchise literature is, however, silent on the knowledge and 
innovation co-creation and the orchestration role that the hub firm plays to achieve the 
objective of the network. As stated above, we argue that to be successful, decentralizing, 
adapting and managing knowledge and innovation are important part of microfranchise 
network. Microfranchising in itself represents an innovation which is a departure from 
traditional enterprise development in the BOP market which considers every single small 
and informal business owner as entrepreneurs. Microfranchise has offered a business 
framework to organize those micro-entrepreneurs and to enable them to access organized 
supply chain and capacity which they otherwise struggle to access given many institutional 
voids in developing markets (Fairbourne, 2007). Hence, our study suggests that the 
innovation network literature is a fertile ground to leverage new insights into 
microfranchise literature. Orchestration of innovation framework developed by Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe (2006) and many subsequent empirical studies conducted by scholars such as 
Ojasalo (2008), Busquets (2010), Nambisan and Sawusing (2011), and Leven et al. (2014) 
have demonstrated the value addition that is derived from managing innovation 
appropriability and knowledge mobility as part of the network orchestration function of the 
hub firm. 
Our case study revealed how BOP farmers, the microfranchisees and the suppliers 
were given the space by the hub firm within the network to make suggestions and innovate. 
As an example, our empirical results demonstrated that the coconut oil cake, although used 
in some part of Bangladesh, was not a commercial product. Krishi Utsho as a hub firm 
demonstrated its openness to the idea and suggestions made by the microfranchisees and 
the BOP farmers and took on itself to further investigate the viability and efficacy of the 
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product to contribute to solve an important milk quality issue BOP farmers were confronted 
with. Our analysis demonstrates how the hub firm valued the creativity and suggestions 
coming from the network members and how it further investigated the potential of the new 
product and launched it in the market. As a result of this openness to innovation and 
feedback from the network members, the coconut oil cake is now becoming a top performer 
product for Krishi Utsho.  
Ensuring knowledge mobility between various network members, in our study 
between supplier firms and microfranchisees on technical topic such as animal health 
product’s prescription, disease detection and technical advice to customers among others, 
proved to be a useful and cost effective way to manage knowledge mobility towards 
achieving the intended quality standard. The hub firm did not have to develop all the 
expertise in house. It effectively leveraged the expertise and capabilities of other network 
participants, in this case the suppliers, to educate the microfranchisees. Our evidence also 
revealed that in addition to leveraging the supplier firms, the hub firm worked with the 
public sector animal health department to have them train the microfranchisees and BOP 
farmers on animal health issues. The hub firm also decentralized the knowledge sharing 
and assured knowledge mobility through the weekly health fair it organized for the BOP 
farmers and in which both the government department and the private supplier firms 
participated. The BOP population who is customer of the network was empowered to 
contribute to knowledge and innovation to achieve the goal of the network. However, the 
hub firm played a strong coordination role to ensure that knowledge generated and shared 
are adding value to the network instead of disengaging itself from this role. This was 
demonstrated by the fact that the hub firm used the weekly health fair to listen to the 
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concern of BOP farmers and collected their suggestions on how to continuously improve 
the network. The three way innovative payment system that the hub firm established 
between the microfranchisees, the milk collectors and the BOP farmers is a good 
illustration of this. Engaging BOP population in designing and applying strategies to solve 
BOP issues while creating value for business is in line with the mutual value creation in 
the BOP literature which London et al. (2010) and many scholars have advocated. 
Furthermore, our findings are in line with the adaptation to knowledge templates in BOP 
markets and the role of social interaction between BOP entrepreneurs and technical experts 
who understand the “why behind each practice”, in this case the hub firm itself but also the 
supplier firms and the government veterinarian offices, to result in improved performance 
(Sutter et al., 2014).   
Hence, we argue that microfranchise networks have a lot to learn from innovation 
networks theory. The hub firm, the microfranchisor, has a strong role to play to manage 
knowledge mobility and innovation appropriability within the network (Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe). It has to create the appropriate environment to unleash the potential of the network 
members, including the BOP population, to generate innovation and knowledge, to 
collaborate and form multiplex relationships in order to co-create value. Thus, a “table with 
four legs” analogy could be used to illustrate the important role we see for each category 
of the network actors, in this case the hub firm (1), the microfranchisees (2), the suppliers 
and any other key actors (3) and the customer themselves such as BOP farmers (4) to be 
actively involved and incentivized to create knowledge and innovation and to share them 
among the network members when appropriate. However, given the difficult BOP context 
characterized by weak human, social and financial capitals and institutional void,   
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knowledge and innovation can leak easily, and as demonstrated by Sutter et al. (2014), 
social interaction among BOP entrepreneurs themselves without an intermediation from an 
expert broker could be presumptive. It is therefore primordial for the hub firm to 
continuously educate network members, forge a fruitful relationship, set a robust rule of 
engagement and manage knowledge creation and mobility as well as innovation 
appropriability effectively to achieve the financial and social impact goals of the network. 
Hence, we posit that:  
Proposition 1: Microfranchise-based innovation networks will more likely enable 
co-creation of value when the hub firm decentralizes and orchestrates knowledge 
and innovation management and enables broad participation. 
 
The importance of identifying and managing imprinting in microfranchise-base 
innovation networks:  
While the origins of an organizational identity lie in the decisions and actions taken 
at the time of creation, the identity forms and solidifies over time in a somewhat path-
dependent process (Albert & Whetten 1985). As defined by Marquis and Tilcsik (2013), 
members of networks and associated stakeholders all develop characteristics that reflect 
prominent features of their formative environment which persist despite significant 
environment changes in subsequent periods. Subsequent research suggests that imprinting 
may have long lasting effects upon the strategies, strategic choices, and operating practices 
of firms (Bamford, Dean, & McDougall, 2000; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). As such, 
organizational imprints establish powerful behavior guidelines that affect organizational 
choices and performance. If imprints are critical to firm behaviors and choices, then 
achieving competitive advantage and above normal returns may be dependent on 
organizational imprints (Kriauciunas & Shinkle, 2008). 
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Hence, it is extremely important to understand the imprints of each prospective and current 
member, in this case microfranchisees, the microfranchisor itself and any other 
stakeholders associated with the network such as suppliers, financial services providers and 
BOP population. In the case of the microfranchise-base innovation network, Krishi Utsho, 
imprinting affected the behavior, culture, business model or ways of doing business, 
membership in formal and informal network, perception and aspirations, motivation and 
incentive systems of the network members. We revealed that some imprints were positive 
while others were negative. Strategies should aim at managing both and managers should 
design and orchestrate microfranchise innovation networks accordingly. The positive 
imprinting is an asset to leverage to achieve the goal of the network while the negative one 
should be managed carefully in order to reduce damaging impact on the network’s 
outcomes.  
Our empirical evidence revealed a number of examples to illustrate both negative 
and positive imprints of the network members. For instance, selling poor quality products 
to BOP farmers was one negative imprint of the microfranchisees joining the Krishi Utsho 
network. Lack of trust between BOP farmers and the microfranchisees was another 
negative imprinting revealed in our empirical study. The microfranchisor did put a lot of 
effort and investment to reduce this imprinting and forge new paths for the 
microfranchisees to adopt quality norms and use the best in class customer services 
strategies. On the other hand, the hub firm leveraged the informal network that already 
existed between the franchisees as they were part of the livestock health workers 
association to drive home its value proposition and recruit prospective microfranchisees. 
Krishi Utsho also used peer pressure to discourage malpractice in the network. Both are 
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good example of how the hub firm leveraged the positive imprinting of some of the network 
members. Another example of how the hub firm leveraged the positive imprinting was by 
organizing weekly animal health fairs to educate customers and bring them closer to the 
microfranchisees to build trust.  
Understanding the imprints and categorizing them will help to develop strategies 
and tactics to manage them. It will also contribute to decision making for a more effective 
design and orchestration of the network. For instance, once Krishi Utsho had a better 
understanding of the imprinting of the microfranchisees, it refined a set of selection criteria 
to recruit the new cohort of prospective microfranchisees into the network in the Growth 
and Reconfiguration stage. Our empirical evidence also revealed that once the hub firm 
had better understood that the animal health supplier firms did not have the vested interest 
to change their business model given their well-developed distribution channel, it started 
to diversify its supplier firms with new ones willing to change and adapt their business 
model to Krishi Utsho.  
We also argue that imprinting affects network structure and network position in the 
design process and should be carefully managed. Our evidence demonstrated that the 
imprinting of the franchisees and the BOP context which is characterized by weaker formal 
institutional environments and weak rule of law (de Soto, 2000) makes the governance of 
the network unpredictable and informal. Although Krishi Utsho drafted a franchise 
contract, it has not signed it yet because of the inability to enforce contract in rural 
Bangladesh. Another reason was the fact that many microfranchisees were not used to 
signing and respecting formal contract. Krishi Utsho is therefore investing its limited 
resources to educate the microfranchisees to understand the importance of signing and 
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respecting contract before signing it with them. As a result, Krishi Utsho had to anticipate 
any risks the weak structuring of the network may create and needed to be pro-active in 
managing it. One example from our evidence of this is the fact that a microfranchisee 
revealed his intention to go to the same supplier firms and buy in bulk and sell to other 
microfranchisees in the network. This thought impedes on the essence of what Krishi Utsho 
as a hub firm and microfranchisor is doing for the network.  
In addition to network structure, imprinting affects the network position. Our 
evidence revealed many instances of this phenomena. One example was the lack of 
understanding of the mission and the end goal of Krishi Utsho by the majority of the 
supplier firms. This confusion came from the fact that Krishi Utsho did not yet have a high 
brand visibility with many of the supplier firms, and the later still associated the network 
with a typical time-bound development project of CARE. As a result, many decisions and 
actions from the supplier firms, especially the animal medicine firms undermine the 
positioning of Krishi Utsho as the hub firm. A concrete illustration is that sale managers 
from the supplier firms at the regional level competed with Krishi Utsho and positioned 
themselves directly with the microfranchisees to be able to derive higher sale in order to 
capture higher bonus for themselves. This highly undermined the position of Krishi Utsho 
in the network.   
Drawing on our case analysis and extant literature, Table 11 highlights some 
imprinting in BOP context and some exemplar strategies to manage them, especially in the 
agriculture sector, which designers of microfranchise network should be aware of. In 
conclusion we posit that:  
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Proposition 2: Microfranchise-based innovation networks will more likely enable 
co-creation of value if the hub firm considers and appropriately manages the 
imprinting of participants during the network design and orchestration  
 
Table 12: Imprinting and exemplar strategies 
Stakeholders  Positive Imprints Negative Imprints  Management strategies for hub firm 
Microfranchisees  Membership in 
informal network  
Poor adherence to 
quality standards 
Leverage informal network 
membership to recruit members 
into the microfranchise network.  
Use of peer pressure to achieve 
adherence to high quality standard 
Microfranchisor / 
Hub firm  
Strong mandate 
focused on 
creating value for 
BOP population 
Lack of business 
culture to sustain a 
microfranchise 
innovation network 
outside of 
philanthropic funding  
The mandate on BOP population is 
an asset to maintain to avoid 
mission drift of the microfranchise 
innovation network  
Recruit staff with business 
experience and make room with 
specific processes within large 
NGO’s operation to incubate and 
successfully spin-off social 
enterprise 
Suppliers  Well-developed 
supply chain in 
BOP market 
Lack of 
understanding of BOP 
context and value co-
creation  
Select suppliers who understand 
and committed to the goal of the 
microfranchise network and willing 
to adapt their business practices to 
co-create value 
BOP farmers  Eager to improve 
farming as 
business, women 
are particularly 
very receptive to 
change 
Lack of trust toward 
agro-input industry 
Include BOP farmers, especially 
women, as part of the value co-
creation to harness their best ideas 
to innovate and create value  
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The combination of innovation network theory and network imprinting theory offers a 
comprehensive lens for empirical inquiry into design and orchestration practices and 
related outcomes in innovation networks. 
While the orchestration of the innovation network framework (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 
2006) and the imprinting theory (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) were relevant to analyze our 
case study and shed insights, scholars have looked at both separately. We argue that it is 
by looking at the two together that we gain richer insights into the process of designing and 
orchestrating innovation networks to co-create value.   
Through our evidence, we uncovered how each member joined the network with 
its imprints and how the imprints affected the network membership, thereby altering how 
the network was designed and orchestrated. Thus, to make the innovation network effective 
in achieving its outcome, it is important to be deliberate about understanding imprinting 
upfront and to design strategies and tactics to manage it. Furthermore, designing and 
orchestrating an innovation network in a BOP context has different end goals. Although 
achieving financial sustainability is important, maximizing profit is not often a key driver. 
Achieving positive social impact is equally important. Our empirical evidence revealed 
that the goal pursued by CARE through the Krishi Utsho microfranchise network was to 
allow BOP farmers’ timely access to affordable, quality agricultural input and services to 
increase their production, income and well-being.   
Hence, we propose a combined framework of designing and orchestrating 
innovation networks, keeping in mind the BOP context. We position the imprinting as 
antecedent of the network design and orchestration activities, but also as a constant factor 
that alters the innovation network design and orchestration. Figure 7 presents our proposed 
extended framework, based on theory and our empirical evidence. We consider carefully 
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the circumstances in the BOP market and made some changes to the framework. In addition 
to having the imprinting as an antecedent that needs to be carefully identified and managed 
for each member of the network, including the hub firm itself and the end customers (in 
our case, BOP farmers), we made three modifications. The first modification is managing 
network sustainability as part of the network orchestration activities. We argue for 
sustainability instead of stability, given the fact that many networks in the BOP context 
tend to be short term, informal and donor dependent. While network stability is important, 
especially in a politically unstable environment, the nature of innovation network is 
constant change and disruption which ideally allows for constant innovation. Instability of 
the network is not bad in itself as long as the hub continues to competently manage the 
entire network and co-create value. However, not achieving a long term sustainability and 
remaining dependent on donor funding as it is the case for Krishi Utsho can jeopardize the 
long term viability of the network. We further elaborated on this argument below. Second, 
we added network imprinting management as part of the orchestration function, as 
discussed above. Continuous management of imprinting once the network members are 
selected is an important management activity to minimize negative imprinting and to 
leverage positive ones to achieve the outcome of the network. Third, we changed the initial 
network innovation output by two important network outcomes in the context of the BOP 
market. We advocate for financial sustainability because of the dependency of many BOP 
ventures on donor funding (Karamchandani, Kubzansky, & Lalwani, 2011; London & 
Hart, 2004) and the need to achieve financial independence in order to allow for scale and 
replication. Furthermore, we advocate for social impact as part of the network outcome. 
Innovation output in itself is not enough, and the network should create value for society. 
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This is in line with the intent of the BOP venture to create at least a double bottom-line, 
achieving profit and positive change in people’s life. Increasingly, many management 
scholars are also advocating for shared value creation between business and society (Porter 
& Kramer, 2011), which is a well-founded argument in our view.  
  
 
Figure 13: Adapted framework for network design and orchestration 
 
VII.2 Contributions to practice 
The empirical results demonstrated the relevance of the theoretical framework for 
the design and orchestration of the microfranchise network in Bangladesh. Our study also 
revealed a number of insights and opportunities for CARE and Krishi Utsho in the 
emerging microfranchise social enterprise. Against that backdrop, we present three lessons 
we hope CARE and other practitioners in similar situations can learn from our research.  
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Lesson 1: CARE and Krishi Utsho will more likely achieve their intended goals if they 
continuously assess and appropriately manage the imprinting of network participants.  
 
Network imprinting theory (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) plays out prominently in 
the way a microfranchise innovation network is designed and orchestrated. Our analysis 
found that Krishi Utsho had mixed results in assessing and appropriately managing the 
imprinting of all the network participants. We highlight three important imprints that Krishi 
Utsho and CARE should understand and continue to manage appropriately, in order to 
expand the network and co-create value between the participants, including BOP farmers.  
First, Krishi Utsho needs to continue to assess and manage the imprinting of the 
candidate microfranchisees that are recruited to join the network. An important negative 
imprinting that surfaced from our findings is quality of animal health products. In fact, the 
animal health industry in Bangladesh, especially animal medicine and vaccinations, is not 
strongly regulated and enforced. As a result of this institutional void and the lack of 
customer formal education, which is associated with the BOP population (London et al, 
2014), many firms abuse the situation and sell counterfeited products in the market. 
Therefore, many microfranchisees had the perverse incentive to sell counterfeited products 
that procure them higher revenue. Thus, they found it very difficult to change behavior as 
they joined the microfranchise innovative network. Krishi Utsho used a number of 
strategies and tactics, as revealed in our finding such as education, imposing a quality 
standard rule, and peer pressure, among others, to reduce this negative imprinting and to 
build the reputation of the network and its brand. The learning gained by Krishi Utsho 
should continue to help refine the selection criteria and the induction of new 
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microfranchisees into the network. Krishi Utsho should also be able to gain in efficiency 
as it continues to develop and streamline its network design and orchestration processes.  
Second, our findings revealed that many animal health firms who supplied the 
Krishi Utsho network already had a robust distribution chain in place in rural Bangladesh. 
This represents an important imprinting on the new business model. Our discussion with 
the representatives of those supplier firms revealed that they were not ready to modify their 
business model, given their strong market position and their lack of understanding of Krishi 
Utsho’s end goal. In fact, this imprinting explained why the supplier firms did not 
recognize their participation in the Krishi Utsho microfranchise innovation network as 
strategic. The implication for Krishi Utsho is to revisit its relationship with those suppliers. 
Perhaps when Krishi Utsho is able to demonstrate an economy of scale, an important 
market share and efficiency, it may be in a position to renegotiate its current relationship 
with the animal health product supplier firms. Another opportunity for Krishi Utsho is to 
start afresh with other suppliers who are not currently selling to BOP farmers. But again, 
assessing and understanding the imprinting of those new suppliers and how it could be 
managed would still be an important consideration for Krishi Utsho. Indeed, the 
microfranchise innovation network has ample opportunity to introduce other lines of 
products that are not currently sold through the network, but are in demand by BOP 
farmers. The relationship with two animal feed companies and the positive results achieved 
to date with the branded feed with Krishi Utsho’s logo, and the new coconut oil cake, 
provide evidence of an ability to fulfil previously unmet demand, and a track record on 
which Krishi Utsho can build. Poultry, fisheries, agricultural equipment, financing, and IT 
are many other opportunities Krishi Utsho could develop with other suppliers to forge 
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mutually beneficial partnerships. Krishi Utsho needs to consider carefully if any of the new 
supplier firms are willing to alter their imprinting to do business with the network and co-
create value.  
Finally, our findings revealed that CARE itself was heavily imprinted as an 
incubating entity of the Krishi Utsho microfranchise innovation network. CARE is a 
seventy-year-old nonprofit global organization with large-scale humanitarian and long-
term poverty reduction programs in Bangladesh and in over ninety other countries. CARE’s 
brand recognition and reputation served Krishi Utsho well, as revealed by our empirical 
evidence. An example is the trust the CARE brand commanded with BOP farmers, given 
CARE’s history of over sixty years in Bangladesh. The same is true of the franchisees 
themselves, as CARE provided entrepreneurial assistance to many of them through the 
Dairy Value Chain Project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Another 
important advantage Krishi Utsho derived from its association with CARE was the 
philanthropic funding it was able to mobilize to initiate and develop the microfranchise 
innovation network. Without this funding, the network would have struggled to grow, 
given its novelty and social mission. On the other hand, Krishi Utsho faced important 
imprinting challenges as a startup incubated within a large humanitarian and development 
organization with no prior experience in developing a microfranchise innovation network. 
This had implications for the design, orchestration and performance of the network as 
revealed in our findings. One example is the fact that Krishi Utsho was forced to outsource 
the supply chain management of the network to a third party firm due CARE’s onerous 
warehouse policy that was not adapted for the startup operations of Krishi Utsho. This 
added complexity and cost to the innovation network. Another piece of empirical evidence 
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is that CARE’s traditional and nonprofit human resource policy inhibited Krishi Utsho 
from using a market-based commercial approach to hire competent staff who are 
remunerated based on performance targets. This slowed down the operations, and it took 
over a year to hire a managing director of the network with experience in supply chain and 
business management. A lesson learnt from this process is the need for a better awareness 
within nonprofit leadership, aiming to incubate social enterprises. They may consider 
developing parallel processes for a social enterprise startups. This may help resolve some 
of the operational challenges faced by Krishi Utsho. 
 
Lesson 2: CARE and Krishi Utsho will more likely have sustained impact if they 
systematically experiment with and gradually transition to financially self-sustained 
strategies and practices with social impact on BOP farmers. 
 
Ensuring network stability, especially in a very fragile political environment is 
extremely important, and our findings revealed that Krishi Utsho demonstrated relevant 
attributes in this regard. However, in an innovation network, change is constant and 
disruption helps to push the envelope for innovation creation. Ensuring financial 
sustainability and positive social impact is therefore more important for BOP ventures than 
only ensuring stability. As found by many researchers and as argued earlier, organizations 
engaged in BOP ventures have struggled to achieve financial sustainability in order to 
create new business models suitable for the BOP environment (Karamchandani, 
Kubzansky, & Lalwani, 2011; London & Hart, 2004). Krishi Utsho did, however, prove 
that the microfranchise business model is attractive to BOP micro-entrepreneurs who 
converted to become microfranchisees. Within a year, many were able to break even and 
become profitable. On average, they increased their sales revenue by 50% more than 
similar micro-entrepreneurs who had not yet fully converted to the network. This 
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achievement encouraged many other micro-entrepreneurs to join the network. Achieving 
financial sustainability is equally crucial for Krishi Utsho as a hub firm and microfranchisor 
for many reasons.  
First, while philanthropic funding is helpful, given the dire poverty context in which 
Krishi Utsho is operating, the continuity of this type of funding is not guaranteed. In fact, 
many scholars and pundits argue against relying only on philanthropist funding, given the 
unstable, short-term project focus of such sources. They argue for more long-term patient 
capital instead (Easterly, 2006; Woodworth, 2007). Additionally, they argue that 
microfranchisee and consumer awareness of donor involvement can hinder the economic 
success of BOP endeavors (Kistruck & Beamish, 2010). Second, we posit that a social 
business such as Krishi Utsho should be able to achieve a certain level of financial 
independency in order to be able to continue to expand the network, innovate, and create 
value. As of the end of December 2015, the network is only able to cover 25% of its 
operation costs through the revenue it generates. The remaining amount is covered by 
philanthropic funding. Third, we argue that achieving financial independence will give 
confidence to CARE and any other organizations interested in BOP population and 
microfranchising to replicate and scale-up the Krishi Utsho business model, elsewhere and 
in other industries. 
Achieving financial sustainability without the social impact intended on the BOP 
population is meaningless, given the mandate of Krishi Utsho as a social enterprise. 
Fortunately, the survey conducted by Krishi Utsho, on the BOP farmer’s customers in 
2015, demonstrated many indications of a positive impact. Streamlining the impact 
measurement process as part of the routine business operations and leveraging 
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technological platforms, such as mobile phones, could be an opportunity for Krishi Utsho 
to explore. Developing a robust and cost effective customer management relationship 
system is another opportunity Krishi Utsho needs to consider after collecting timely 
feedback from its customers, in order to continuously improve its operations and impact 
on BOP farmers.  
Lesson 3: CARE and other development organizations will more likely leverage 
microfranchise models if they design and orchestrate their efforts as emergent 
innovation networks.  
 
Our study focuses on how a microfranchise network may be designed and 
orchestrated to co-create value, given the gap in BOP and microfranchising literature. 
Because networks are often studied from structural, relationship and outcome perspectives 
(Cook & Whitmeyer, 1992), using the innovation network theory (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 
2006) offers relevant insights for practice, not only for CARE, but for many other 
organizations interested in developing a microfranchise network to co-create value within 
a BOP population. As posited by Dhanaraj and Parkhe, for an innovation network to be 
designed and orchestrated, there is a need for a central actor called the hub firm. In this 
case, CARE, through Krishi Utsho fulfilled the hub firm role as network designer and 
orchestrator. Krishi Utsho demonstrated several of the attributes that Dhanaraj and Parkhe 
identified with a hub firm, such as the prominence and power position within the network, 
and being a leader and connector, influencer and value creator. In particular, Krishi Utsho 
placed a strong focus on its value creator role, not only for the network members, but also 
for the BOP farmers who are the “raison d’être” of the creation of the microfranchise 
network.  
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From a design perspective, Krishi Utsho artfully identified and recruited the first 
cohort of microfranchisees and evolved the process over time, based on lessons learnt. As 
our evidence pointed out, Krishi Utsho maintained a low attrition rate among the 
microfranchisees. Only four microfranchisees dropped out, with the total number of 
microfranchisees increasing from the initial 15 to 110. Krishi Utsho also demonstrated an 
increasing understanding of how to grow its supplier firms as members of the network. Our 
findings demonstrated that Krishi Utsho engaged in a delicate balancing act to structure the 
network membership and to position itself as a central player despite the challenges that it 
faced with the animal health supplier firms. From a network orchestration standpoint, our 
empirical evidence suggests Krishi Utsho demonstrated orchestration of innovation 
network characteristics, such as managing knowledge mobility and innovation 
appropriability throughout the network. We provided some concrete examples of this in 
our previous sections. Krishi Utsho also managed to stabilize the network, especially in 
times of crisis, such as during the political turmoil which paralyzed the economic activities 
of the entire country in 2013 and 2015.  
While the findings support the case that Krishi Utsho has demonstrated effective 
orchestration of the network, there was no deliberate framework or playbook by which the 
orchestration took place. Most of the orchestration was trial and error, given the lack of 
prior experience within CARE and within the industry. Thus, the rigorous process 
suggested by Dhanaraj and Parkhe in the orchestration of innovation networks, with some 
adaptation to the BOP context, could help streamline the orchestration process. For 
instance, there was no deliberate innovation development process in place to stimulate the 
members of the network, the BOP farmers, or anyone else, to suggest, innovate, or to be 
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rewarded to grow the network to co-create value. The lack of such processes creates the 
potential for unauthorized imitation which can stifle and weaken innovation appropriability 
(Sakakibara, 2002; Teece, 2000), especially in the context of institutional voids that 
characterize BOP markets with weak legal institutions (Kistruck et al., 2013). CARE and 
other organizations that are interested in designing and implementing a microfranchise 
network could, therefore, make use of the orchestration of innovation network framework.  
VII.3 Limitations 
Although this dissertation contributes new knowledge and insights to advance the 
knowledge and practice of microfranchising to engage the BOP, the study has few 
limitations. First, we used a single qualitative case study that may limit our ability to draw 
rich insights to inform our contributions to theory and practice.  Ideally, we would have 
liked to research other similar microfranchise innovation networks from various industries 
(consumer goods, health, financial services, etc.), orchestrated by other actors, such as 
private corporations and non-governmental organizations such as CARE. Further studies 
could also look at the end goal of such networks, whether it is profit, positive social impact, 
or a combination of the two. Therefore, this represents an opportunity for further study to 
test some of the propositions as well as the new integrated framework combining the 
imprinting and network innovation we developed.  Second, our study was qualitative in 
nature, which presents some limitations to generalize to a larger population of 
microfranchise innovation networks. Our propositions are, however, generalizable to 
theory. Our lessons also offer important insights to improve the design and orchestration 
of innovation networks. Nevertheless, it might be useful to conduct quantitative or mixed 
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method research to further test our propositions and the new integrated framework to draw 
additional conclusions.  
Third, a good part of our data was recalled by the participants. This may be 
subjected to forgetting as people’s memory fails. We, however, triangulated the data 
obtained and made use of the extensive literature available on our case to remain as much 
as objective as we can.  
Fourth, another limitation of this study may be some personal biases, given my 
position as a CARE employee and my involvement in advising the team in Bangladesh 
during the design and orchestration of the Krishi Utsho innovation network. However I 
remained as objective and impartial as possible. I used several methods, such as 
triangulating the information I gathered, engaging the practitioners themselves to review 
my result section and collecting several feedbacks from many others researchers, including 
my committee members. Although a limitation, this was an opportunity for us to draw from 
our personal experience to access data and insights that might otherwise be difficult for an 
outside researcher. In addition, the engaged scholarship promoted by Van de Ven (2007), 
among other scholars, advocates for this type of practitioner/researcher as part of the new 
wave of applied research that uses scientific knowledge to influence practice, and vice 
versa.  
VII.4 Conclusion 
Our study examines how innovation networks are designed and orchestrated in an 
embedded context. We studied an emerging microfranchise innovation network that CARE 
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is facilitating in Bangladesh to provide timely access to quality agricultural input and 
services to thousands of BOP farmers.  
Our results revealed four main stages in the design and orchestration processes that 
were matched-up with the orchestration of the innovation network, as well as network 
imprinting theories. We found very interesting insights to contribute to the gap in the 
literature and to the practice on how such innovation networks are designed and 
orchestrated in a BOP context. Imprinting manifested prominently in our findings, and we 
highlighted the need to identify it up front and to manage it during the design and 
orchestration of the innovation network.  
We also highlighted two categories of imprinting, both negative and positive, and 
the important role the hub firm plays in managing it, leveraging the positive imprints to 
achieve the goal of the network, while minimizing the damaging impact of the negative 
imprints.  
We also found that microfranchise networks are indeed innovation networks and 
could benefit from using the framework developed by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) to better 
manage knowledge mobility and innovation appropriability. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated how network imprinting theory and the orchestration of innovation network 
theory could be combined as an integrated framework to inform the design and 
orchestration processes.  
We argued that imprinting should be an antecedent function of the innovation 
network, as well as continuous management activities as part of the orchestration process. 
We also suggested a few additional variables to be added to the framework, such as 
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managing for sustainability, in addition to stability and creating a double bottom line 
financial and social impact, as part of the innovation outcome. We argued for these 
additions, given the entrenched societal issues that such innovation networks try to achieve.  
Finally, we contributed several lessons for practitioners at CARE and other 
organizations interested in designing and orchestrating innovation networks in an 
embedded context. We argued that our findings could well be applicable to the context of 
other developed countries.  
As such, considering the gap in the literature and the infancy of microfranchising as 
a tool to fight poverty and contribute to economic development, our study advances 
knowledge and practice, and is a source of inspiration for further research.    
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VIII APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: Name of supplier firms in Krishi Utsho network 
Input Input Supplier 
Establishment 
of Partnership 
Feed 
Tamin Agro Industries Ltd. 
2012-13 
Fatema Feed 
ACI Godrej Agrovet 
Private Ltd. 
Medicine 
Chemist Agrovet Ltd 
The ACME Laboratories 
Ltd. 
Opsonin Pharma Ltd. 
Square Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd. 
2013-14 Renata Ltd. 
Novartis (BD) Ltd. 
 
Appendix B: Detailed results of test on Coconut Oil Cake 
Day 
Body 
Weight 
Age 
of 
Calve
s 
(day) 
Green 
Grass 
Consumption (Qty) Milk Production 
(Qty) 
Effect on Fat 
(%) Concentrate Provided 
Coconut 
Oil Cake Rice 
bran 
Wheat 
Bran 
Others 
First 
Half 
Second 
Half 
First 
Half 
Seco
nd 
Half 
Day-
1 
235 kg 40 35 kg 0 2.5 kg Water 1.0 kg 4.5 Lt 4.0 Lt 3.2 3.2 
Day-
2 
235 kg 41 30 kg 0 3.5 kg Water 1.5 kg 4.5 Lt 4.0 Lt 3.4 3.3 
Day-
3 
235 kg 42 32 kg 0 3.5 kg Water 1.5 kg 5.0 Lt 4.5 Lt 3.4 4 
Day-
4 
235 kg 43 30 kg 0 3.0 kg Water 2.0 kg 5.0 Lt 4.5 Lt 3.6 4.8 
Day-
5 
235 kg 44 35 kg 0 3.0 kg Water 2.0 kg 5.0 Lt 4.5 Lt 3.5 4.1 
Day-
6 
235 kg 45 30 kg 0 3.0 kg Water 2.0 kg 5.5 Lt 5.0 Lt 3.8 4.9 
Day-
7 
235 kg 46 30 kg 0 3.0 kg Water 2.2 kg 5.5 Lt 5.0 Lt 3.7 5.1 
Day-
8 
235 kg 47 35 kg 0 3.0 kg Water 2.2 kg 5.5 Lt 5.0 Lt 3.6 4.1 
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Appendix C: Customer impact results 
Savings of Cost and Time: 
 
Indicator 
Feed Medicine Vitamin 
Before After Before After Before After 
Distance Travelled (KM) 
          2.2
8  
          0.9
8  
          2.5
9  
          1.6
7  
          2.6
5  
          1.7
9  
Time Spent for Travel 
(Min.) 
        28.2
1  
        12.1
2  
        28.0
7  
        15.5
5  
        27.3
9  
        16.8
9  
Cost of Travel (BDT) 
        66.3
6  
          5.6
9  
        20.2
5  
          8.2
7  
        17.9
7  
          9.1
0  
 
Frequency of visit:  
 
Indicator Before After Cause 
Frequency of Visit 2.84 3.7 Frequency has increased due to the proximity of shops to the 
community 
  
Social Impact 
 
Women Empowerment: 
 
        
          
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before After 
Influence of Women in HH Decision making 46% 85% 
Influence of Women in house renovation decision  25% 95% 
Influence of Women in Husband's Income generation 24% 84% 
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Food Security  
 
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
Perception toward Krishi Utsho  
The survey has also collected data on farmers’ perception of Krishi Utsho’s impact on their 
lives. Figure below presents the perception on eight potential indicators. It turns out that 
58% farmer experienced increased expenditurevc in goods, 56% experienced increases in 
educational spending, 57% increase health spending, 54% of farmers experience increases 
in agriculture expenditure. Same as seen food, cow health, dairy consumption a dairy yield.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
94%
94%
93%
76%
54%
57%
56%
58%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Impact & Satisfaction Increased
HH Goods Expenditure Edcational Spending Health Spending
Agri Spending Food Spending Cow Health
Dairy Consumptipn Dairy Yield
Major Food Type Expenditure 
 Before After 
Rice/Wheat 579 626 
Fish/Meat 543 622 
Vegetables 346 393 
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